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PREFACE 
( The problem of German reunification has become a sensitive issue af-
\ 
fecting international peace. Wartime understandings between the United 
States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union on the reconstruction of Germany 
broke down under the clash of divergent national interests of the condo-
minium powers, The Western decision to integrate part of Germany into 
the Atlantic alliance resulted in Germany's partition into two separate 
states. This division of the German nation to eliminate a dangerous power 
vacuum in Europe and stabilize the balance of power was not accepted as 
definitive by the Germans, particularly in the Federal Republic. The West 
German political parties cooperated with the Western powers in the es-
tablishment of the Federal Republic and in.its integration into the Atlantic 
alliance. In return the Western powers supported West German aims of Euro-
pean revisionism. 
Since the restoration ·Of independence and sovereignty to the Federal 
Republic in 1954, the West Germans have two alternative paths to nation-
al reunification. They can persist in support .of the Western bloc policy 
of applying relentless pressure on the Soviet Union in order to force the 
Soviet Union t~ restore German unity as the price for ending the Cold War. 
Or they can seek a ·rapprochement with the Eastern bloc by d.irect negoti-
ations with the East German authorities and the Soviet Union. The 
Christian Democrats .have pursued the former poii~y, whereas until recently 
the Social Democrats inclined towards a diplomatic detente with the Connnu-
· nists. Should Adenauer's "hard" policy bec.ome manifestly unpopular, or 
iii 
the Western powers .waver in their determination to support West German 
goals of revisionism, there is nothing that would prevent the Federal 
Republic from shifting to a "soft" policy to effect the reunification 
of Germany. However, this would presumably take place only if the CDU 
felt that its p0sition of leadership would not be endangered by a 
rapproch:.e1nent with the Eastern bloc. 
The international aspects of the German reurtification problem have 
been analyzed in considerable detail in order to present·t~e necessary 
terms of reference for the positions of the West German political parties 
on national reunification, After a summary of the complex legal status 
of Germany under the four-power cond0minium, the policies of the Western 
p0wers and of the Soviet Union are analyzed. Then, since the West 
Germans have evolved an effective two---party system of government, the 
principal subjects of this study are the Christian Democratic and the 
.Social Democratic parties. B0th parties have made the restoration of 
German unity the goal of their foreign policy proposals to the German 
electorate. Each party has made reunification a major political issue 
in successive elections. In the impending election campaign the two 
parties are nearly in agreement for the first time on the policy of 
German.reunification. The Social Democrats have, in effect, abandoned 
their former 11soft11 policy approach. Ironically, now that Adenauer has 
achieved apparent consensus in West Germany on CDU foreign policy, power 
realities may ,force him to modify the 1.1hard" characteristics of the 
traditional CDU reunification approach. 
I wish to expre.ss my sincere appreciation to Professor Clifford A. 
L. Rich, my maj0r adviser, who, in addition to the invaluable suggestions 
and time afforded to this thesis, has made my graduate work a busy, 
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stim-qlating and rewarding e:,cperience. My thanks also to .Professors 
Robert Walker and Alfred Levin wh0 read this thesis; to Miss Mary Jaime 
and Mrs. Alice Pattee of the Library Catalog Department wh0 rendered 
vital and prompt service to my frequent and often unusual requests for 
material; to the Parteivorstand of the Social Democratic Party of Germany 
which most graciously contributed valuable party source material; and to 
my friend and colleague Bob Quinten who afforded inspiration and an en-
during appreciation.of scholastic idealism, 
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CHAPTER I 
FOUR POWER DIPLOMACY AND THE QUESTION OF 
GERMAN REUNIFICATION 
TheLegal Status of Germany 
-Legal Basis Ef the Four-,Power Condominium: The military objectives 
of the Allied powers in World War II were intended to bring about the 
total defeat of Germany ·and ·to evidence this defeat by requiring an un-
conditional surrender. Faced with-the impending power vacuum in Europe 
which would be -created by such a defeat, the principal Allied powers 
sought to establish certain arrangements which would govern their move 
into this vacuum. Consequently, the Western pewers and the Soviet Union 
centracted c-ertain legal rights and obligations .with respect to Germany 
in numerous conferences .which were-held during and innnediately after 
World War II. The legal bases of the occupation concleminium .were es-
tablished by ·these conferences and an analysis of them is required in 
order to indicate the present involvement of the great powers with re-
spect to -German'reuni-fication. 
The first important agreements cancluded by the Allied p0wers were 
the protocols of September anc.il November; 1944. Meeting ·in Londen in 
September, 1944, the governments .of the United .States, Great Britain and 
the Soviet Union agreed on the-division .of Germany-into three zones of 
occupation.1 Provi·sion was likewise made for the jeint occupation -of the 
1Subs.eque.nt agreements at Yalta sanctioned certain exce.ptions to the 
.1 
2 
city of Berlin. The occupying forces in the respective zones were to be 
under the control of the Commanders-in-Chief and provision was made for 
an Inter-Allied Governing Auth0rity (Komendatura) to "direct j0intly the 
administration of the Greater Berlin Area." 
An amending protocol of N0vember 14, 1944, defined the limits of the 
American and British zones, such delimitation having been postponed in 
September, Specific mention was made of the American right of transit 
facilities through the British zone, a matter which had been most con-
spicuous1y omitted in the September protocol with respect to American and 
British rights of transit through the Soviet zone. This omission has 
since constituted a constant source of friction between the Western powers 
d th S . u. 2 an· e oviet nion. 
In addition to this amending protocol, the three powers also con-
eluded on November 14, 1944, an Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany. 
Referring to the duties of the Commander-in-Chief of the occupation zones, 
Article 3 of this protocol provided for the establishment of a supreme 
organ of control, to be called the Control Council. The functions of this 
· Control Council were to be as follows: 
1937 boundaries. The Soviet Union and.Poland were authorized to undertake 
certain annexations of territory belonging to the Third Reich. Definitive 
·recognition of these annexations was; however, to await the conclusion of 
a peace treaty. 
2Moreover, there is the possible legal view that the Western powers 
still pessess no concrete rights of transit regarding access to and egress 
from West Berlin. There .has never been any normative agreement concerning 
these rights. The Berlin Blockade was terminated in May, 1949, at a four-
power meeting held in New York. A subsequent conference of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers agreed that the New York agreement was to be maintained, 
but such a. provision; being purely contractual,.would not seem to retain 
validity in the event of a separate Soviet peace treaty with East Germany. 
The United States maintains its rights of transit on other bases; however 
these may also be legally questionable, 
(i) to ensure appropriate uniformity of action by the 
Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupation; 
(ii) to initiate plans and reach agreed decisions on 
the chief military, political, economic and other questions 
affecting Germany as a whole, on the basis of instructions 
received by each Commander-in-Chief from his Government; 
(iii) to control the German central administration, 
which will be responsible to it for ensuring compliance with 
its demands; 
(iv) to direct the administration ef "Greater Berlin" 
through appropriate organs . 3 
The Yalta Conference, February 4-11, 1945, further affirmed the 
principles of unconditional surrender and the division .of Germany into 
occupation zones . An agreement was reached at this time regarding the 
allocation of an occupation zone to France, to be formed out of the 
British and American zones. France was also admitted to the Allied 
Control Council. Likewise agreed on at Yalta, although not officially 
released until two years later, was a secret amendment to the German 
surrender terms. It provided that: 
"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and 
the Union ·Of Soviet Socialist Republics shall pessess supreme 
auth0rity with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such 
authority they will take such steps, including the complete 
disarmament, demilitarisation and dismemberment of Germany 
as they deem requisite .for future peace and security. 114 
3 
3 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents.£!! Germany, 
1944- 1959, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959 (hereafter referred to as 
Senate Committee en Foreign Relations, Documents _Q!! German_y, 1959) , p. 
6. Although this Control Council was never to achieve any significant 
degree of coordination of occupation policies, the original occupation 
rights and powers of the cond0minium states remained legally unimpaired . 
Each retained from the right of conquest and the agreements which allo-
cated the zones of occupation, governing powers within its occupation 
territory. See Hans Kelsen, "The Legal Status of Germany according to 
the Declaration of Berlin," American Journal of International Law, 39 
(1945), pp. 518-26. 
4senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents.£!! Germany, 1959, 
pp. 8-9. With slight modification (the word "dismemberment" was omitted) 
this paragraph was inserted as Article 13(a) of the Declaration Regarding 
the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by the 
Allied Powers, June 5, 1945. 
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From the foregoing it is evident that the only limitations on the rights 
agreed on would be those of individual self-limitation. If the Yalta 
signatories had later been able to act in accord and pursue common poli-
cies affecting the whole of Germany, such authority would have enabled 
the Control Council to act decisively and with efficacy toward a purged, 
but 'intact Germany. This point illustrates the fact that there can be no 
question of 'the rights which both .East and West pos·sess in Germany. The 
main block to German unity has be,en that the Western powers and the Soviet 
Union ,are exercising, for the most part, the same valid legal rights toward 
totally different p0litical ends. German -reunification has consequently 
been lost in the middle of this political lineation. 
At the end of the war in May, 1945, the Allied powers had already 
agreed on many ·aspects of the division and occupation of Germany. The 
Tripartite Conference of Berlin (Potsdam Conference) was convened in 
July to discuss and attempt the settlement of the many outstanding problems 
created by the final collapse of Germany. The agreements made at Potsdam 
have been the seurce of considerable controversy, insofar as the Western 
powers and the Soviet Union have engaged in mutual charges and criticism 
regarding the prolongation of a divided Germany. The provisions of the 
Potsdam Protocol affecting Germany, however, were largely restatements of 
previous agreements and did not constitute a new and comprehensive state-
ment of Allied policies and aims regarding the treatment of Germany. De-
spite this fact, the legal positions that are ,currently maintained by the 
East and the West regarding the German question are in large part based on a 
fundamental disagreement as to whether the Potsdam Protocol did, in ,fact, 
constitute a de~ avowal on the part of the Allies (the position of 
the Soviet Union) or whether it was but a restatement of previous agreements 
5 
( the Western position). 5 
There were, to be sure; statements in the Potsdam Protocol which set 
forth more .clearly what had previously be.en sketched or assumed. Such 
items as "uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout 
Germany,!! and a provision that "during the period of occupation Germany 
shall be treated as a single economic unit,11 were enumerated with,imt 
qualification and therefore stancil. out as blatant examples of the disunity 
which ensued. 
The nonfulfillment of these principles has formed the basis of recent 
Soviet policy. The Soviet Union maintains that its conclusion -of a sepa-
rate peace treaty with the German Demo.cratic Republic would be legally 
justified in view of the violations which have occurred with respect to 
the political and economic principles of the Potsdam Protocol. The Soviet 
Union disclaims any -further respcmsibility under the aegis of the _Potsdam 
agreements, charging the West with having unilaterally repudiated the 
validity of the entire protocol. 
The Western powers, however, base their legal rights to a large ex-
tent on the protocols which preceded the .Potsdam agreements. Alth0ugh 
the West does not accept the Seviet view that the .Potsdam agreements have 
been invalidated.') it ·has based its legal rights on the preceding protocols 
rather than attempt to merely counter the S0viet Union's interpretation 
of the Potsdam Protocol. 
5For the respective positions of the Soviet Union and the .United 
States regarding the relationship of the Pot·sdam Protocol to the legal 
and political rights in questiong Ibid., pp. 317-31, "Note from the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Ambassad0r at Moscow)" November 
27,, 1958, and pp. 336-47:, !!Statement by the Department of State on Legal 
Aspects of the Berlin ·Situation," December 20, 1958. 
.6 
The -1944 protocols and the Ya:lta and Potsdam conferences ·essentially 
cover the agreements which esta.blished the occupation condaminium. The 
·legal status of Germany was clearly established by these agreements. 
Political differences between the East and the West_:, however, have des-
troyed the .original aims and purposes of the comfominium, viz. the es-
tablishment -of a unified democratic German state. 
Breakup .of the .Comiam:inium and Emergence o.f Separate German States 
(German Federal Republic and German Dem0cratic Republic): Although the 
institutions of condominium con:trol wei-e .generally well-formulated, they 
were predicated on the one-factor which.was .never actually achieved, 
that of cooperation. Difficulties developed soo'n after the German sur-
·render due to the divergence of p0litical and-economic interests between 
the Western .powe:rs and the S0viet Union. The many .facets .of disagree-
ment cannot be -enumerated fully, but among them were such issues as ·the 
dismantlement of German -industry, zonal exchanges of food and .goods and, 
.. 
· most -- important-, · mutual suspicion -of one an0ther's political aims. Dis-
agreement over specific ·policies, of course,·resulted from the -efforts 
of both the East and the West to ·consolidate their-power in Europe and 
to deny to the _other any .positional advantage. The division ·-of Germany, 
which had been agreed on by the Allied. powers, fore.shadowed what was to 
be the dual nature of world pol:l.tics in the po$:t-wa-r period. East and 
West Germany arose from the division-of Europe into Anglo-American and 
Russian spheres of interest. 
The Soviet Union's distrust of the Western .powers increased as it 
became evident that the Western -powers were not disposed to recognize 
the Russian ·interpretation -of the understandings .which had be.en reached 
at the Yalta and.Pot-sda:m conferences. Specifica:lly, the Soviet Union -
was dis,turbed by the Western hostility toward the Soviet consoli.dation 
7 
of power in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union.had·taken,for granted:its 
right to establish "friendly" regimes in Eastern Europe and.feared,. per-
haps correctly, that the Western powe:rs were attempting to-restore the 
,cordon sanitaire and once .again,isolate the Soviet Union.from Europe. 
Aside from .fears .of Western dominance, the Soviet Union was clearly 
interested in all that ·it c.ould obtain by fiat of military conquest. 
Soviet forces were in control .of Eas·tern Europe at the clese of the war 
and a swift and .efficient consolidation of Soviet p0:wer occurred throughout 
the occupied areas. .The blunt tactics of the Soviet Union ·in. carrying 
out this p0licy hastened the demise of Alli'ed unity and the Western 
powers steadied themselves to counter the onrushing tide of Soviet im-
peria1ism. In view of the deteriorating relations between the Soviet 
Union and the Western p0wers, the Soviet blockade of Berlin, as a means 
of testing Western determination, .followed logically. 
The various details of the blockade cannot be .discussed within -the 
limited scope of this presentation. .The .fact:, h0wever., that the Soviet 
. 
Union-failed in an eutright attempt to force the Western p0wers frem 
their advanced.position ·in Berlin determined, in part, the subsequent 
cours.e of Soviet ·policy. In sh0rt, the Soviet Union had to recognize 
that the Western powers would not tolerate or ·acquiesce in the consoli-
dation of S0viet control over the whole of.Germany. The tentacles o.f 
open Soviet hegemony were withdra.wn and a period of "trench warfare,~' 
in the German.campaign ·of the Cold War; ensued. 
Thwarted in its .attempt to force the Western powers out of Berlin, 
the Soviet Union effic·iently prosecuted the extension of control over 
East Germany. The Soviet Union originally exercised .far more p0litical 
initiative in ·its occupation zone than ·did the Western p0we1's. 
8 
Experienced and reliable German Communists .were placed in .key p0sitions 
of the reconstituted .apparatus 0f civil adniinis·tration. A German 
People'.s C0ngress was established by the Soviets:, although its activi-
ties were largely carried out for it by the Presidium-of the German 
People':s Council. .This Council was essentially a front organization -of 
the German Connnu.nist Party. Wilhelm Pieck, Chairman af the Presidium, 
and Walter Ulbricht_, .Chairman of the Economic Committee -of the Congress; 
- served to execute -many of the dictates of the S0viet occuJ:)ation -officials, 
wh0 wished to ·impart an -air -0f legality and p0-pular support to their poli-
cies. 
The 1948 -petiti~n of the P·eople' s Congress .for ·a plebiscite on 
-German-unity was indicative of the earlySoviet ·policy to appear as the 
champion of German unity. An appeal was directed to the Control Council 
by the Presidium of the People's C0uncil, -requesting that the Commanders-
in-Chief honor ·the millions of signatures collected on the unity petition. 
The letter to the -Control Council from the Presidium stressed the legal 
conformity 0f the petition ·to the principles set forth in the Atlantic 
Charter and the Potsdam Protocol. 6 
Althaugh of no lasting ,significance ,regarding -reunifica·tion, · the -ef-
fe-ct of the ,petition was ·to .further East German claims of validity. 
Walter Ulbricht.quickly.declared that the-circulation -of the-people's 
petition -had."confirmed the legal basis for the activity of the German 
People's Council. n7 The ,growing ass·ertions -of Eas·t German legitimacy 
prompted Wes·tern .action. 
6see Beate Ruhm von Oppen, Documents .Q!!-Germany under Occupation, 
1945,-1954, (London., 1955), p. 285. 
7Ibid., p. 292. 
9 
Faced with this increasing consolidation -of powe;r in East Germany, 
the Western powers decided to combine their occupation ·zones into a 
single civil government. The o.ccupation ·zones of the three Western 
powers had previously be.en combined, first on a bi-,zonal basis and later 
into tri-zonia. The formation of a central German.g"vernment in the 
West mean:t that German political .,partie-s would be given the "pportunity 
to operate on ·a wider scale-and the Lan<l headquarters of the various 
-parties intensified·their efforts to bring about cohesive and -effective 
national organizations. 
The decision ·to establish a West German government was reached at 
the London Six-Power Conference, held February 23 to June 2, 1948. The 
delegates to the Conference .(United Kingdom, United-States, france, 
Belgium, Luxemburg and· the Netherlands) autharized the establishment .af 
a federated German state in the Wes·tern zones· of occupation ·and pro-
vided .for meetings of the military-gavernors with the Miriisters-,Presi-
dent of the zones. The framework was erected for the drafting of a 
federal constitution and its approval by a constituent-assembly. A 
communique issued.on June .2, 1948j was careful to .state that the recom-
mendations of·the Western pc.)we:rs were in no way prejudicial to the 
eventual accomplishment af German unification ·through ·four--·power agree ... 
8 
ment. 
The Saviet Union ·responded quickly to ·this ac-tion -of the Western 
pawers·. In June., 1948; subsequent to the London Six-Power Conference., 
·the Communist Bloc countr:i:es held a conference at Warsaw. At the con-
clusion-of the meeting, the Foreign Ministers af·the Eastern Bloc issued 
8M. E. ·Bathurst, Germany and the .North Atlantic C()mmunity, (London, 
1956}, p. 70. 
10 
a statement charging the West with responsibility for the division ·Of 
Germany. Declaring that the establishment of a West German state would 
inevitably foster "chauvinism" in Germany, the Communist Foreign Minis-
ters stated their intention to "take more .effective measures to combat 
the instigators of a new war." The Warsaw declaration further held the 
actions of the Western powers to be in violation -of the Potsdam Agreement 
and destructive of quadripartite -control machinery in Germany.9 
Such "more effective measures" were soen taken. Soviet concern 
over the separate Western action eventually culminated in the establish-
ment.of the Communist-controlled German Democratic Republic on October 
7:, 1949, with Otto Grotewohl as Minister-President. The Western powers 
immediately took the position that the East German.government was ille-
gitimate and charged the Soviet Un:ionwith having established a puppet 
regime, not based on ,free elections. The Soviet re.sponse to these charges 
was that the Bonn.government was the pul)pet regime and that the Demo-
cratic Republic was legitimate.lo 
The Soviet Union,·h0wever, was already -prepared to recognize the 
90ren Poage, "The Creation of a Western German Federal Republic as 
a Result of the Cold War;" (unplib. M.A. thesis, George-town University, 
1950), p. :209. 
10von Oppen, pp. 422-3: Statement by General Chuikov, Supreme Chief 
of the Soviet 'Military Administration, October 8, 1949. Chliikov charged 
that West Germany had .fallen into -''the hands of yesterday's inspire.rs of 
the Hitler regime.~, The legitimacy of the .Democratic Republic was justi-
fied on -the contrary basis. Chuikov s-tated ·that, "Under such conditions 
. one canrnlt help but recognize as legitimate the striving of German demo-
cratic circles to take into their own hands the restoration of the unity 
of Germany and·bring about the renascence of the ,country on democratic 
and peace-loving principles. Precisely ·in this· respect'- does the S0viet 
Government see the ess-ence of the decisions · of the German People's 
-Council on -putting into operation the Constitution.of the German -Deme-
cratic Republic and on the formation, in Berlin, of a Provisional 
Government of the German Democratic Republic." 
11 
de facto e]!:istence of two German states and proposed quite early that the 
East and West German authorities should negotiate directly o:p. the .question 
of reunification. An early agre·ement in this respect would have .worked 
to the advantage of the Soviet Union during the ensuing period of East-
West deadlock.11 Otto Grotewohl, the Minister-President of the Democratic 
Republic, made several appeals to the West German officials regarding 
mutual efforts toward settling the reunification problem. Such overtures 
were rebuffed by Chance1lor A~enauer and his Government. 
The original position of the United States Government that the 
German Democratic Republic lacked democratic legitimacy has been main-
tained by the Federal Republic. Secretary of State Acheson charged in 
a statement of October 12-, 1949, that the German Democratic Republic lacked 
pepular support and was a creation of "Soviet and Communist fiat.1112 The 
United States refused to recognize the Democratic Republic as a legiti-
mate government representing the people of the Soviet zone and flatly 
denied that ii could 9laim any validity as a 11true" government of Germany 
as a whole. 
The Federal Republic subsequently echoed this policy and countered 
the Democratic Republic claim of all-German representation with a state-
ment by Chancellor Adenauer before the Bundestag, repudiating the con-
tention of the Democratic Re,public and claiming sale legitimacy for the 
Federal Republic as the ·representative of the German nation. 13 AdenauerVs 
statement did not appear until some two weeks after Secretary of State 
llcf. Alistair Horne, Return_!£ Power, (New York, .1956), p •. 349. 
12von Oppen., p. 424. 
13Paul Weymar, Adenauer~ His Authorized Biography, (New York, 1957), 
p. 292. See also von Oppen, p. 432. 
12 
Acheson's remarks, indicating the reluctance of the Federal Republic to 
precede the Western powers in a policy declaration relevant to the question 
of German unity. 
The Petersburg Protocol of November 22, 1949, closely.followed the 
Soviet announcement of the ·establishment of the Democratic Republic. 
This convention conferred de .iure recognition ef the Federal Republic by 
the Western powers and defined the status of the Western occupational 
authorities in West Germany.14 
The.ultimate status which the occupation powers imposed on Germany 
in 1949 was thus vastly different from the intentions of the victorious 
Allied powers in 1945. Although difficulties pertaining to the·recon-
struction of a mutually acceptable Germany had no doubt been envisaged., 
the.creation of two separate German states was clearly the unforseen .re-
sult of discordant actions taken between 1945 and 1948. Thus the partition 
of Germany, whicp. had been discussed and rejected by the Allies during the 
war, occurred because of their failure to agree on how one Germany.was to 
be reconstituted. 
Western Policy and Germany 
Political Aims and Objectives~ The Western decisi·on of 1948 to create 
an independent, German sta.te within its occ1,Jpation zones was motivated by 
balance of power requirements in Europe. The Soviet consolidation of 
power in Eastern Europe and its efforts to spread Communist influence in 
14The Petersburg Protocol was the first bilateral agreement between 
the Western powers and the new West German. state-. It conferred prestige 
upon the Adenauer regime by recognizing it as an e.qual before the German 
state had been restored complete sovereignty. See Richard Hiscocks, ~-
cracy in Western Germanr, (London, 1957), p. 51. 
13 
Germany threatened the political and military equilibrium in Europe. If 
the Western pewers were going to forestall Soviet he,gemony in Europe they 
had to enlist the active collaboration of the-nearly fifty million Germans 
who resided in their occupation zones. German power was of vital im-
portance to the Western effort to contain the Soviet drive for European 
domination. _Western diplomacy.has aimed consistently since-1948 at the 
re-gene.ration of Gernian power within the framework of the Western bloc, and 
at the -assumption by the German Federal Republic of increasing·burdens.and 
responsibilities as part of the Western alliance system. 
The immediate consequence of the Western decision to build that part 
of Germany which was under-its control into -an integral unit of the 
emerging Western bloc was the de facto partition of Germany. The Soviet 
- . 
creation of the German Democratic Republic in the territory.under its con-
trol was the Russian response to the West. The integration of Eastern 
Germany into the.Communist bloc has proceeded pari .passu·with the inte-
gration of Western Germany into the Western bloc. German hopes for 
national unity have declined year by year as the de facto partition-of 
Germany became the basis for the ·maintenance of an equilibrium-of power 
between the Western and Communist blocs in Europe. In compensation, West 
Germany has been raised ·to ·respected status .and ever-increasing influence 
within the Western bloc, and the Western powers have agreed to support 
German national aspirations vis-a-vis the Communist bloc. The price which 
the Communist bloc has been called u,pon t0 pay for a negotiated·· modus 
vivendi in EurQpe that will relieve it from Western pressures, and which 
constitutes the quid pro quo of West German collaboration-within the 
Western bloc, is the liquidation of the Communist regime in East Germany, 
the restoration to the German inhabitants of East Germany of political 
, .. 
14 
liberty, and the evacuation by the Russians and the Poles of those terri-
tories which formed part of Germany under the Versailles Treaty. Thus, 
the Western powers exchanged a promise to make common cause with the West 
German state in applying relentless pressure upon the Communist bloc un-
til West German territorial aspirations have been achieved, in return for 
a West German commitment to join the Western alliance and share the burden 
of containing Soviet power in Europe. This agreement between the West 
German state and the Western bloc, which mobilized German power to serve 
Western interests in the Cold War, was not regarded as essentially in-
compatible with the goals of the containment policy, particularly after 
containment was interpreted to achieve the eventual expulsion of Soviet 
power and influence from Eastern Europe and restore the status guo ante 
bellum to that region. 
Western espousal of West Germanyvs revisionist aspirations coincides 
with the revisionist orientation of Western bloc policy vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union in Europe. It is difficult to say whether the major Western 
powers, particularly the United States, realize that should such a policy 
goal be successful and a powerful united Germany be re-established, the 
Western powers might be faced again with an uncontrollable Germany. It 
is likewise difficult to ascertain whether American policy is ttreally" 
bent on "rolling back" Soviet power and influence in Eastern Europe, or 
in terminating the de facto partition of Germany. It is obviously neces-
sary for the United States and its Western allies to assert the aim of 
restoring to the West German state the boundaries which existed prior to 
1938 in order to keep the West Germans within the Western alliance. Should 
the Western powers openly abandon this commitment to the West Germans, the 
latter might seek a direct accomodation with the Soviet bloc on terms which 
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could imperil the viability of the European balance .of power. 
Proposals and Policies: The first three years following the end of 
the war (1945-1948) may be ·characterized as the early formative .period of 
Western policy regarding the restoration of Gerl!lan unity. Also during 
this period, American efforts to achieve the -reconstitution of democratic 
government in Germany as a whole, and in the American zone of occupation 
in particular, greatly influenced the future ·character of political parties 
in West Germany. Along with these efforts came ·some of the first pro-
nouncements of United States and Allied policy regarding German reunifica-
tion, many of which have.found their way into the programs of certain 
political parties in the.Federal Republic. In analyzing certain of these 
pronouncements, attention will be drawn to their adoption or elaboration 
by the German party leaders. 
Following the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 
April and May, 1946, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin pointed out 
the-growing divergence of Soviet and Western policies in Germany. He em-
phasized the economic and ·political pr,,-blems which were resulting from 
the lack of co0peration and the failure .of the Soviet Union to participate 
· 1· 15 in a common po icy. Such comments grew in number as policy coordination 
was increasingly subordinated to power .politics. 
Secretary of State James Byrnes made the -first major restatement of 
United States policy toward post-war Germany in Stuttgart, Germany, a few 
months later. Byrnes' address warned against the danger of allowing 
Germany to become a "pawn in a military struggle .for power between the 
East and the West" and called for the restoration of ·self-government to 
15von Oppen, p. 14L 
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the German nation as a whole. 16 This latter request was backed up with 
an outline of the recommended procedure to be followed in establishing a 
central German government. 
The United States plan contained reference to the establishment of 
a provisional government for Germany, composed of representatives from 
the various states and.provinces. This projected German National Council 
was to take charge of governmental affairs on an.ad hoc basis and draft a 
federal constitution for Germany. The ·constitution was to be submitted 
first to a constituent assembly and then to the people for final approva1J7 
No mention was made of the one item which later proved insurmountable 
in conferences between the East and the West. This issue, the conduct and 
supervision of elections, has since become the sine qua !!Q!! of Western and 
Federal Republic reunification proposals and has been further qualified by 
the CDU position that there must be a period of adjustment to new conditions 
before elections can be held. This advocation of a breathing spell is de-
signed to afford the "terrorized population" of the Soviet zone an oppor-
tunity to acquaint itself with the changed situation and create the right 
"atmosphere of freedom" in the Soviet zone before holding electionsJS 
At the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held ,in 
November and December, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall further set forth 
16senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on G~rmany, 1959, 
pp. 35-42. 
17Ibid. 
18Bundesministerium fuer Gesaintdeutsche Fragen, Die Bemuehungen der 
BundesrepU:blik ~ Wiederherstellu_gg der Einheit Deutschlands durch 
gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, {Bonn, 1952), pp. 30-1~ As phrased by Chancellor 
Adenauer in his speech before the Bundestag of March 9, 1951, "· •• die 
rechtlichen und _psychologischen Voraussetzungen fuer d'ie Abhaltung freier 
Wahlen." 
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the Western position. Marshall connected German unity with the "free 
movement .of goods, persons and ideas throughout Germany" and pointed out 
the .futility of negotiating an agreement on Germany in the absence of 
such freedom.19 The United States statement concluded by attributing 
the disruption of German unity to the 11 policies and practices of the 
occupying powers. n20 Such self-.criticism as this was not overlooked by 
German political leaders. Several years later Chancellor Adenauer stated 
that 11 the partition of Germany has come about not because of any internal 
German dissension 9 but because of a conflict among the four great powers.n 21 
The same argument has been used by the other German political parties as a 
convenient political mattress to justify their paucity of accomplishments 
in German reunification. 
At the conclusion of the London session, British Foreign Secretary 
Bevin ci:mmieinted on the danger of establishing an overly centralized German 
government, and announced that Britain would not support any.plan for unity 
which would result in an 11unrepresentative and bogusn German government.22 
In this connection the CDU, in 1946 and 1947, stressed the .fact that its 
program was firmly in support of a federalized all-German state. During 
the same period the Social Democratic lParty (SPD) generally seemed to 
favor a unitary :system of government, although it was willing to make 
19van Oppen, p. 263. 
20Ibid. 
21cL Konrad Adenauer, Worlg, Ill.divisible, (tr. 0 Richard and Clara 
WinstonL (New York, 1955), p. 105: Adenauer went on to say that, 11 It 
follows therefore that Germany is vitally interested in an easing of the 
East-West conflict and the establishment of conditions under which the 
four great powers can come to an agreement concerning German unity. 11 
22 Von Oppen, p, 267. 
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concessions to Bavarian federalism, 23 
On June 9, 1948, Secretary of State Marshall issued a statement of 
United States policy regarding the recommendations of the London Six-
Power Conference. He expressed the belief that the problem of German 
unity could. be resolved expeditiously i:f the recommendations were ac-
cepted by the Soviet Union and applied to Germany as a whole. This atti-
tude was later reflected at the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers 
which met in May and June J 1949. It was proposed by the West that the 
East zone acceJpt the Basic Law of the Federal Republic and the subse-
quent establishment of a fou:r-power occupation statute. Soviet Foreign 
Minister Vy:shinsky :rejected this proposal and countered with a plan de-
signed to allow various organized groups in the East zone more partici-
pation in the formation of all-German government, Secretary of State 
Acheson dismissed this counter-proposal with a restatement of the Western 
view that the Basic Law could and should readily be extended to Germany 
as a whole. 24 
Although he advocated this extension~ Acheson had made it quite clear 
a month earlier that any solution to the German problem would have to con-
form to ar:lr'angements prevailing in West Germany at that time. He stated 
that: 
ii The peopll('J of West Germany may t'est as,sured that this 
Ckrverfiffient will agreie to no general solution f iJr GermaJ1Y 
into which th~ buic safeguards and bi1';rtefits of the existing 
Westiern German arrangements would not be absorb~d" Thi!!:iy 
may :re:st al:l9tn"~d that until such a solution can bei achieved., 
23united States War Department, Office o:f Military Governor of 
Germany.9 Political Activ:Lty, (Monthly Repo:rt of the Military Governor, 
US Zone), Noo 12 (July 20, 1946). 
24Eugene Davidson, Jhe Death and Life of Germanx, (New York, 1959), 
pp. 251-20 
this Government will continue to lend vigorous support to 
the development of the West German.program. 11 25 
19·. 
It appears obvious that the "benefits of the existing arrangements" were 
and are totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union. As for continuing the 
"development of the West German program.9" it is likewise worth noting 
that this policy has been exercised to the fullest advantage of the CDU. 
That party has occupied the fortuitous·position of political leadership 
which helped carry out the policy and profited from its execution. 
The policy of the Western powers toward the newly-created Federal 
Republic was again set forth on September 19.i 1950.9 at a meeting of the 
Western Foreign Ministers. The statement of policy closely paralleled 
the official view of the Federal Republic, It emphasized the legitimacy 
of the Federal Republic vis-a-vis the Demo.cratic Republic.i declaring the 
former to be "the only German government freely and legitimately consti~ 
tuted. 11 26 The Foreign Ministers also gave plecl,ges that any attack 
upon the Federal Republic would be considered an attack upon the Western 
powers themselves, 
The Communist bloc,countries, including the German Democratic Re-
public.:, met at Prague in October.i 1950. A set of proposals were 
drafted regarding the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the 
achievement of German unity.9 in that order. Secretary of State Acheson 
commented on the Communist proposals of October 25 by rejecting any 
conclusion of a peace treaty prior to the establishment of a uunified 
democratic national government11 for Germany.27 Acheson~s statement 
25un:ited.States Department of State (hereafter referred to as U.S. 
Dept. of St~t~), The Current Situ~tion in GermaJ:, PubL No. 3506.9 Euro-
pean and Br1.t1sh Commonwealth.Series (May, 1949. 
26cf, Bathurst, .pp. lll=l2o 
27von Oppen, Po 534. 
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specifically stated that Western. support was. firmly· behind .·the 
views of Chancellor Adenauer and the Federal Republic.28 This Western 
attitude of referring to the Federal Republic on matters relating to re-
unification worked to the.political advantage of the Government party. 
CDU politicians could point to the fact that the Western powers .were 
fully c0gnizant of·and .in sympathy with the views of the Federal Govern-
:qient-. 
The attitude of the .United States during the.period between the 
Petersburg Prot@col and the Berlin Conference of 1954 was·mainly one of 
holding the line in Germany by reiterating the Western position set .forth 
on the occasion of the 'Prague Resolutions. More and more emphasis was 
placed on the ·role of the Federal Republic in bringing about reunifi-
cation9 usually revolving around the theme that the -strength of the Federal 
Republic lay in its acceptance of democratic principles which would triumph 
in the end. United States.policy ·also ·became more assertive regarding the 
security issues at stake ·in Germany and stre-ssed the "alert and uncompro-
misingRt ·position ef the United States vis-a-vis the Sovi·et Union. 29 
During the same period the Sll;)viet Union also began·to emphasize the.role 
iOlLthe Democratic Republic in achieving reunification, but the means it 
proposed, direct negotiations between.East and West Germany, were much 
less na.ive than the moralistic Western line that fldemocracy would triumph.!11 
In view of SiOlviet propaganda charging ·the United States with perpetu-
ating the -division of Germany, American_ policy became more vocal in de-
fending its position. Blaming the Soviet Union for the failure to conclude 
28Ibid. 9 p.·534. 
29u. s. Dept. of State, The Future of Germany, Publ. No.-3779, Euro-
pean and British Commonweal th Serie-s (February 9 1950). 
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a definitive peace treaty, the United States openly stated its intention 
to give the Federal Republic increased support in offsetting the pressure 
of communism. Western policy also became conce:r-ned with launching appeals 
to the Germans in the Democratic Republic. The United States stated its 
intention and obligation to "restore to these people, by peaceful means, 
the same·rights and liberties which·their fellow citizens in the West en-
joy todayo 11 30 When Chancellor Adenauer visited the United States in 1953, 
the Chancellor and President Eisenhower issued a joint communique which 
called for "sustained common efforts" and reiterated the Western demand 
for free elections in the Democratic Republico 31 
Seeking to break the deadlock on German unity, the four-power Berlin 
Conference was held January 25 to February 18, 19540 From the standpoint 
of accomplishments the conference was of little significance. However, 
the positions taken by the Western powers and the Soviet Union, re-
spectively, set forth the limits of compromise which .persist to the 
present. The Western proposals were set forth by British Foreign Secre-
tary Edeno Eden~ s plan .of German reunification proposed five steps~ 
I. Free ·elections throughout Germanyo 
II. The convocation of a National Assembly resulting 
from those e1ectionso 
III. The drafting of a Constitution and the preparation 
of peace treaty negotiations. 
IV. The adoption of the Constitution and the formation 
of an all-German government responsible for the negotiation 
of the peace treatyo 
30u. S. Depto of State, Germany Today and Tomorrow, PubL No. 4655, 
European and British Commonwealth Series (July, 1952) o 
31Press Office.!> German Diplomatic Mission, Washington, D. c., 
Collected Speeches, Statements, Press, Radio and TV Interviews~ Dr. 
Konrad Adenauer, (New York, 1953), po 46~ The material herein stems from 
the Chancellor~s visit to the United States and Canada, April 6-8, 1953. 
V. The ·signature and entry·into force of the peace 
treaty.32 
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Eden stressed the importance o.f free ·and -impartial elections. A uniform 
ele·ctoral law was to be prepared by the four occupying powers along the 
lines of the·existing electoral laws of the Federal Bundestag and the -East 
German Volkskammer. 
Eden's plan was not a seri,ous departure from previous Western pro-
posals 3 although it did dr@p certain qualifications which had previously 
been placed on the supervision of any all-German elections, the.plan did 
not insist on the participation of neutral supervisers. Instead, the 
four.powers were to .form a Supervisory Cannnission and admit ·neutrals at 
their discretion. The Commission was to·draft the all-German electoral 
law and supervise the resulting elections. Significantly, the Eden plan 
provided for decision by majority vote in the Supervisory Connnission. 
Such a procedure, allowing no use of a veto, was obviously unacceptable 
to the Soviet Union in view of the three-to-one Western majority. 
The .Eden plan was-careful to clarify the international rights of 
the ·envisaged new all-Gerxnan government~ The .plan. provided that: 
The -all-German government shall have authority to assume 
the ·international rights and obligations of the Federal Re-
public and the Soviet-Zone of Germany and to conclude such 
other 'international agreements as it may wish. 33 
Again, such a provision was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, since the 
greater influence .of the West German .parties would presumably cause ·an 
.all-German government to favor .membership in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Or.ganizationo 
32Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents .2.!! Germany, 
195-9, pp. -115-17. 
3'3Ibid. 
23 
In replying to the Eden proposals, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov 
made little mention of free ·elections and, in fact, refused to recognize 
the Eden plan.34 Molotov proposed that the two German states enter into 
direct negotiations and work out their own solution of the unification 
problem. He was concerned mainly with blocking German participation in 
the proposed European Defense Community. 
The United States . position at · the Berlin Conference was. succinctly 
stated by Secretary of State Dulles. Dulles backed the Eden reunifi-
cation proposals and stressed the unequivocal position of the United 
States on the ne·cessity of free elections. The Soviet proposal that 
East and West Germany negotiate directly was categorically rejected. 
Dulles' statement drew a comparison between Germany and Korea and empha-
sized the point that there.would be no American withdrawal of forces from 
Germany under the .prevailing situation. The disruption of German unity 
was described as "a division between those who have been absorbed and the 
others whe ·· do not want to· be ·absorbed. n35 The -statement by the Secretary 
of State also indicated the increasing participation of the .Federal Re-
public as a "silent :partner" at great power negotiations •. Dulles stated 
that: 
'IWe were constantly in contact with the Government and 
political leaders of the Federal Republic and we knew that 
they did not want us to buy German unity at the price of 
making Germany a Soviet ·satellite.n36 
CDU campaigning in the 1957·election by no means overlooked such remarks, 
34cf. Horne, pp. 341-2·. 
35u. S •. De.pt. of State, Our Policy for Germanx, Publ. No. 5408, 
European and British Commonwealth Series (March, 1954), p •. 24. 
36Ibid •. , p. 28. 
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and Government leaders were .quick to exploit the resultant strengthening 
of the Federal Republic's position.37 
After the dreary conclusion of the Berlin Conference events moved 
rapidly. Western restoration of German sovereignty followed as a logi-
cal outcome of the Western admission of the reunification deadlock. The 
Nine-Power Conference held in London from September 28 to October 3, 1954.i 
followed by a conference of the Western Foreign Ministers held in Paris, 
October 20-23, paved the way for the restoration of West German sovereignty 
in May, 1955. France;, Great Britain and the United States declared on 
October 3, 1954, as they had previously stated in 1949 when the Federal 
Republic was created, that the restoration of West Germany sovereignty in 
no way sanctified the permanent division of Germany. Ostensibly, the 
question of German reunification was to remain a responsibility of the 
original occupying powers.JS The restoration of West German sovereignty, 
however, clearly destroyed the fiction that Germany (except for Berlin) 
remained a responsibility of the former occupying powers, The changed 
legal status of West Germany, followed by a Soviet clarification of East 
German prerogatives, resulted in the definitive de jg_r_£ partition of 
Germany into separate independent states. 
The Heads of Government of the United States, the Soviet Union, 
Great Britain and France met at Geneva in July, 1955, but were unable to 
reach any concrete agreement on German reunification. A directive .was 
issued to their respective foreign ministers, expressing four-power 
37cf. U. W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, (Oxford.') 1960L 
pp. 249 .-SL 
38cf. Bathurst, ppo 170-L 
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recognition of a "common responsibility11 39 with respect to the German 
question. Several conferences were held during the succeeding years 
but no new policy was officially promoted by the West. 
Evaluation : An official United States 1955 summary of American policy 
for the preceding decade attributed the continued divi sion of Germany to 
the Soviet Union's desire to make reunification a "bargaining point and a 
political bomb," and reaffirmed the United States policy of "negotiation 
from s trength. n40 The recent preoccupation of Western leaders with the 
Berlin issue has tended t o further emphasize the r elationship of the en-
tire Ge rman ques tion to the balance of powe~ situation in the world today. 
Soviet reunification proposals seek the military neutralization of any 
united Ge rman state and the Western powers adamantly refuse any plan 
which would weaken the NATO shield . 
The various ramifications of United States policy toward Germany, 
such as the refusal to accord de jure recognition to the Democratic Re-
public , are in agreement with and stem from the general policy of con-
tainment. 41 Regarding r ecognition, American spokesmen have maintained 
39This express i on of "common responsibility" has since been held by 
the Western powers t o constitute implicit Soviet recognition of its in-
cumbent r esponsibilities and obligations regarding German reunification 
and , specifically, t he Berlin situation . The Soviet Union' s interpre-
tation of this responsibility has apparently differed from that of the 
West ern powers. The Soviets have sought to discharge this r esponsibility 
by continuing t o urge direct negotiation between Ea s t and West Germany, 
on the assumption that the existence of two sover eign German s tates makes 
such negotiation a necessity and a prerequisite to reunification . The 
political refusal of the Western powers to recognize the East German state 
has kept their interpretation of this phrase in line with traditional 
policy. See the note of the British Government to the Government of the 
Soviet Union, December 31, 1958 ~ Great Britain, Foreign Offic e, Germa~ 
No. 1 (1959) , Cmnd. 634 . 
40u. S. Dept . of State, The United States and Germany, 1945-1955, 
Publ . No. 5827 , European and British Commonwealth Series (May, 1955). 
41cf . Franz L. Neumann, "Germany and World Politics," Behind the 
Headlines, 14 (March, 1954), pp . 5-6. 
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that such action would constitute a step away from reunification.42 
Certainly it would be quite incompatible with present Western policy 
objectives to accept the Soviet proposal that East and West Germany 
negotiate directly. However, that policy could and perhaps should be 
changed in view of the serious consequences that .would result from an 
open conflict over disputed rights" The p0licy 0£ Chancellor Adenauer 
and the CDU stands adamantly opposed to any such·recognition and, in 
the case of YugQlslav recognitionJ the West German Government has dis-
played eipen hostility toward the ·recognizing state by severing diplo-
matic relations. 
Regarding the involvement of the present West German Government in 
such policies as nonrecegnition of the Democratic Republic, it appears 
that the current attention given by the United States to the prevailing 
attitudes in Bonn has severely bound American policy with respect to 
German reunification. Since the Western powers have not reciprocated the 
Soviet Union~s recognition of the Democratic Republic, their pelicy has, 
at best:,i been a static one which has resulted in a reduction of the Western 
political position vis-a-vis that of the Soviet Union. It is difficult 
enough to negotiate .on the German question as a "free agent." It becomes 
virtually impossible when the ·limits of compromise are further re-
stricted by political considerations within the Federal Reptiblic,43 
42 See, for example~ James B. Conant, Germany and FreedomJ (Cambridge) 
1958), p. 103. From the Godkin Lectures at Harvard, 1958. 
43For an ~pinionated, but plainly stated analysis of the current 
German situation, see Field Marshal Montgomery ( of AlameinL An A1n~roac!} 
to Sanity, (New York, 1959), pp. 89 ... 94. Montgomery largely attributes 
to Great Britain the role of mediator and promoter of compromise in 
offsetting this growing stratification of positions. 
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United States policy obviously cannot disregard the views of West Germany 
in any settlement which might be made. There is a strategic need, how-
ever, for the Western policy which takes into consideration those ob-
jections of the Federal Republic, which are in reality the particular 
objections of political cliques in the government, 
The Western position that the reunification of Germany nrust precede 
any general disarmament agreement seems to have been brought about, in 
part, by the insistence of Chancellor Adenauer.44 Similarly, the emphasis 
on the creation of a "United Europe" .going hand in hand with the reunifi-
cation of Germany has been heavily influenced by the policy of Adenauer. 
The personal feelings of the Chancellor notwithstanding, it is quite ob-
vious that if the unification of Europe must precede or accompany the uni-
fication of Germany, there will be a divided Germany for a long time to 
come, CDU political leaders, however national-minded they might be;1 can-
not fail to see the advantages in perpetuating this aspect of the Chancel-
lor1 s .philosophy after his departure from the Government, .if they are un~ 
able to achieve reunification on their terms, 
There is, further, the possibility that United States policy re-
garding German reunification is really a negative one 3 that isJ desiring 
the preservation of the status qu0045 The practical effects of Western 
policy give some validity to·this cynical conclusion 3 although no re~ 
sponsible Western statesmen have ever even intimated this publiclyo The 
consequences 0f any such admission would be extremely detrimental to the 
44Cfo Karl Deutsch and Lewis £dingerJ Germany Rejoins the Powers~ 
(Stanford, 1959), PPo 185-'60 
45Ibid,, po 185~ nBoth sides have certain positive stakes in keeping 
Germany dividedo 11 
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Western alliance and to the participation of the German Federal Republic 
in it. The prestige of the CDU would be seriously undermined by Western 
repudiation of German national unity. 
The persistent Western refusal to compromise with the Soviet bloc on 
the postwar status quoJ and its intransigent demand that the West German 
state be restored the territories of the Third Reich as of 1937 at the ex-
pense of S\t))viet and Polish.national interestsJ is totally unrealistic when 
one considers the present balance of power in Europe and the world. A 
similar indictment can also be raised against the Adenauer Government and 
the CDU. If the Western p0we:rs and the Adenauer Government are:i in fact, 
only pursuing the p01icy of European revisionism verbally in order to be-
guile the German electorate and utilize the Germans as an instrument of 
the containment policy in Europe 1 then Western diplomacy must be credited 
with outstanding brilliance and success. 
Soviet Policy and Germany 
Political Aims and Obiectives: The primary objective of Soviet policy 
towards Germany has been the same as that of the Western powers in principleo 
Like the West,, the Soviet Union has adamantly opposed the re-establishment 
of a pciwerful German state which might affect the current balance of p0wer 
to its disadvantage~ The SCJviet Union,, naturally,, would prefer a 
"friendly_/' Le. ~ pro~Soviet all-German state,, This could be accomplished 
by the extension of the prevailing economic and social system in East 
Germany to a reunified Germany. Since the imposition of Communist rule 
on the whole of Ge:rmany'is presently imp0ssible, the Soviet Union pro-
poses to first neutralize Germany, and thereby reduce the relative power 
position of the Western bloc in Europe. The neutralization of Germany 
and the weakening of the West would give preponderance in Europe to the 
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Communist bloc and permit it to achieve in time the absorption of Germany 
into its system of power" By dominating all of Germany, the Communist 
bloc wauld be able to finally achieve total hegemony over Europe. Thus, 
the neutralization af Germany constitutes the first step of the Soviet's 
objective of achieving European hegemony. The minimal objective of current 
Soviet p0licy vis-a--"vis Germany, in the event neither of its other· goals 
can be achieved within the near future, is to force the West to recognize 
the .partition of Germany and the legitimacy of the Soviet position in 
Eastern Eur\\llpeo If the Soviet Union can extract Western recognition of 
the de facto status quo in Germany and Eastern Europe, the Western al-
liance would be seriously undermined by the inevitable popular reaction 
against the CDU leadership in the German Federal Republico Popular dis-
enchantment with the Western powers·and the CDU would certainly result 
from any "betr&yal" of German national aspirations. The Soviet Union could 
then offer to restore unity to the German nation at a price which would 
guarantee Germany's neutralization and friendshipo In time, the Soviet 
Union could hope to abs0rb Germany into its own bloc in c0nsequence of the 
weakening of the Western bloco Soviet aims toward Germany bear great re-
semblance to those of the United States--they seek to revise the European 
balance of power ana establish hegemony by securing political control over 
Germany. In exercising the means to accomplish such objectives~ the Soviet 
Union has been far more aggressive and pragmatic than the Western powers. 
After the emergence of separate German states the Soviet Union ae-
emphasized four.,,.p0wer action in favor of direct negotiations between the 
East and West German states on the basis .of equality. The Soviet Union 
has consistently upheld the principle of German reunification but hasJ 
since 1954, taken the position that the two German states must reach their 
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own modus vivendi. Soviet advocacy of direct German negotiations is, of 
coursej designed to insure Communist .participation and influence in any 
all-German government which might be established by an East-West agree-
ment on Germany. These proposed negotiations are in keeping with Soviet 
policy since 1955, for the Soviet Union recognizes the German Federal Re= 
public as well as the German Democratic Republic. Soviet support .of 
German reunification through four ... p0wer negotiation was maintained only 
so long as this.could be fitted into.Soviet security policy in Europe and 
did not end.anger the post-war balance of power. 
The Soviet Union, unlike the Western powers, may unilaterally grant 
reunification·at any time it chooses. That it has not chosen to do so 
is indicative of the fact that the Western proposals have been completely 
contrary to Soviet security requirements.46 The most desirable outcome 
of German reunification-for the Se-Viet Union weuld be the inclusion of 
Germany in the Eastern bloc. Fears o.f continued West German ·membership 
in the NATO alliance have prompted the Soviet Union to compromise on this 
ideal objective. Recent Soviet proposals have s<:mght to obtain the com-
plete military neutralization of an all~German state. These have usually 
taken the form of a peace treaty provision to prohibit the participation 
of Germany-in any alliance directed against one of the ,former Allied powers. 
The Soviet Union-has·generally been more forthright than the Western 
powers in its policy approach. There exist;i after all;i two sovereign 
46For an excellent analysis of the political factors inherent within 
the German.problem)> see.Hans Jo Morgenthau,-"The Problem of German Re-
unification, 11 The Annals _of the American Academy of Poli ti cal and Social 
Science) 330 (July, 1960))1 pp. 124-32. Morgenthau well illustrates the 
advantageous position of the Soviet Union in this respect and .goes on to 
state that, ft Germany cann0t, at present;i be unified." 
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German states which·cannot be dismantled as easily as they were created. 
Soviet policy has realistically proceeded from this basis and the Soviet 
reunification prop0sals, alth0ugh intended to obtain optimum results for 
Soviet security and power standing, have been geared to utilize the situ-
ation ·as it is .• 
:Proposals and Policies~ The period between the creation of the German 
Democratic Republic and the Berlin Conference of 1954 was essentially one 
of further c1:msolidation of power in East Germany by the Soviet Union. 
The fear of some Western and Germ.an statesmen that Germany might suffer 
the same fate as Korea daes not seem to have been justifiable under the 
circumstances. The S(;,viets had become well aware of the limits of Western 
patience during the Berlin Blockade~ There could have been no doubt as to 
the consequences of an East German war of "liberation." The Soviet Union, 
at that time; was not in a position to acic.ept th0se consequences. 
While the "hot" war raged in Korea., the deadlock over German unity 
was largely limited to .propagandistic statements and Conununist avowals 
of the "peace-loving" policy.of the Germ.an Democratic Republic and the 
Soviet Union.47 At the same time the Federal Republic .was bitterly as-
sailed in the Soviet press~ It was, for example, depicted as the govern-
ment of a "fascist-type ·clique placed at the head of the so-called West 
German state by Anglo=American imperialism.fi48 Chancellor Adenauer was 
subjected·to CQ!nsiderable personal abuse, and was characterized as a 
"puppet-, n kept in power only by the use of American .force. 49 
47Pravda, November 7, 1949. ·Cited in the Conununist Perspective 
(Anonymous publication}, p. 592. 
48Pravda, January 24, 1950: Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, 
Current D:igest .of the Seviet Press (hereafter ·referred to as Current 
Digest,)2, No. 5 (March-ls, 1950), p •. 28 •. 
49Pravda, March 30, 1950~ Current Digest-, 2·, No. 13 (May 13, 1950), 
pp. 24-25. 
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A major indication of Soviet policy during this period was contained 
in the Prague Resolutions of October; 1950, .· which were mainly concerned 
with preventing the rearmament of West Germany.so The Soviet draft treaty 
of 1952 further set forth·this objective of removing Germany from any 
possible anti-Soviet coalition. The draft treaty contained a provision 
that Germany was not to enter any coalitions or military alliances "di-
rected against any power which took part with its armed forces in the war 
against Germany.,n51 The reply of the United States to this proposal 
clearly indicated the incompatibility of Soviet and Western policies~ 
nThe United States Government considers that the all-
German Government should be free both before and after the 
C(l)nclusion-of a peace treaty.to enter into associations com-
patible with the princ-iples and purpo-ses of the United 
Nations.n52 
The Sl\llviet attitude toward West German political parties during this 
period was extremely critical, repudiating their validity and programs, 
and relegating them to the status of mere ,vmouthpieces11 for the Western 
powers. The CDU, naturally, received the heaviest criticism as the 
Government party. Also severe, however, was the Soviet attitude toward· 
the SPD. The large number of Social Democrats who had refused to cooperate 
50cf. von Oppen, p. 5270 Given first priority in the .recommendations 
of the Cemmunist Bloc cenference was a request that the Western p@wers-j 
together with the Soviet Union,· publish a statement that they would m~t 
"permit the remi1itarhation -of Germany, n0r permit it to be drawn into 
any kind of aggressive plans ••• n 
·
51senate c,mrrni ttee 0n Foreign Relations, Docmnents .fil! Germaf!Y, 1959, 
pp. 85.a.87 5 "Note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American.Embassy, 
Enclosing Draft for a German Peace Treaty, March 10, 19520 11 See also 
Pravda, March-12, '1952-~ ·C:tJ,rrent Digest, 4, No., 8 (April s, 1952), p •. 3. 
52senate Conunittee on Foreign Relations, Documents .Q!! Germany, 1959, 
pp. -87-88, r1Note from the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet;. 
Foreign Ministry, Regarding the Soviet Draft of a German Peace Treaty." 
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with the Socialist Unity Party of East Germany were denounced as traitors 
to the cause of socialism, and the .SPD was accused of desiring the con-
tinued division of Germany. A 1952 editorial in Pravda well illustrated 
the Soviet attitude by the title alone: "The Schumacherites--Miserable 
Flunkeys of the Warmcmgers .IY The article accused Schumacher and his .fol-
loweirs of' only pretending to .oppose the Adena,uer Government when they were 
actually in full agreement with Adenauerlls intentions to "suppress the 
patrtotic movement ·Of the people ••• Jor a German peace treaty.n53 The 
West German Social Democrats 9 _quite experienced in verbal warfare., replied 
in kind. 
The position that the Soviet Union took at the Berlin Conference in 
1954 was already indicated in 1953 by a joint comnru.nique issued following 
negotiations between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Reptibl~c. 
This communique stated that: 
nFor the restoration ·Of the national unity of Germany on 
the basis of peaceful, democratic foundations, a provi-
sional all-German government must be .set up by means of 
a direct agreement between Eastern and Western Germany. 
Its main task will be the preparation and carrying out of 
all-German free elections, as a result of which the German 
people alone., without interference from foreign states, 
will settle the question ·~f the state regime (the social 
and administrative structure) .of a united,. democratic and 
peace-loving Germanyo 11 54 
Clearly9 the Soviet Union envi,sioned a proto-Communistic or "pe©plegs 
dem0cratic social and administrative structure" to insure a "democratic 
and . peace-lovint' reunified Germany o 
The Berlin· Conferenc·e of 1954 repre.sented for the Soviet Union, · as 
53Pravda, June 16, 1952~ Current Digest·, -4, No. 24 (July 26, 1952), 
pp. 11 ... 18. 
54von Oppen,.ppo 592-4. 
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it did for the Western. powers, the final positions on the German question; 
subsequent prc,posals have been either a repetition of the 1954 discussions 
or only a slight modification ·-of these. .Irrespective of whether the Soviet 
Union actually intended at the Berlin·Conference to ..achieve German reuni-
fication, the Conference was greatly publicized by the Soviets and was 
utilized as a propaganda s<mnding board. Various mass appeals were organ-
ized within East Germany.i and petitions were circulated among the populacej 
evidencing "support" .for the Soviet prop0sa1s. 55 
The·propi;)sals of the S0viet Union were largely similar to those in-
Cll;)rporated in the Soviet draft treaty of 1952. In view of the agreements 
. 
made by the Western Foreign Ministers in Paris the previous October, 
Molotov~s proposals were primarily concerned with preventing the inclusion 
of the Federal Republic in the Western.alliance. As in 1952, the Soviet 
Union wanted assurances that an all-German state would n0t participate in 
any alliance directed against any -of the former Allied p.owers. Unlike the 
Eden plan, ·the Soviet preposals provided for the withdrawal of all armed 
forces of the occ.upying powers within ane year after the conclusion of a 
peace treaty. All foreign military bases were to be .given up simultane-
ously. The Molotov proposals also-differed from the Eden plan regarding 
the .formation -of a provisional all=German. government and the methl:)d of 
conducting elections. The Soviet plan-called for the provisional govern-
ment to be .formed by. fusing the East ancl West German parliaments, and also 
provided.for the "wide participation of demecratic organizationson56 The 
Soviet Union made .no provision-for ·either a four--power electoral commission 
55ct. H01rne ~ pp. .335-6. 
56Heinrich ·von Siegler, The Reunification and Security .of Germany, 
(Bonn, 1957}, .p. 86. 
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or a commission of neutrals. It left the preparation of an electoral 
law to the provisional government, as well as the supe:rvision and control 
of the elections. Both of these provisions were completely unacceptable 
to the Western p0wers. They feared that the Conunurtists would engineer 
the elections in favor of an all-German "people's democracy." 
It should be pointed out, however, that the Soviet Union later indi-
cated its willingrtess to -reconsider the Eden proposals. This occurred on 
October 23, 1954, at the conclusion of the Paris .Conference. The Soviet 
statement toi this effect was obvi0usly intended to forestall Western 
implementation of the Paris Agreements and prevent the accession of the 
Federal Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Soviet 
note to the three Western p0wers specifically warned that the execution 
of the Paris decisions would "render the .re-,..establishment of Germany's 
unity impossible for a long time to come. 11 57 
Sh0rtly after the termination of the Berlin Conference, the Soviet 
Union clarified the status of the German Dem0cratic Republico The Dem0-
cratic Republic was given the freedom to decide on internal and external 
affairs, including the matter of relations with West Germanyo58 The 
Democratic Republic immediately proclaimed its .willingness to negotiate 
with representatives of West Germanyo Such apparent readiness on the part 
of the Soviet Union and the Dem0!cratic Republic to negotiate directly with 
West Germany has served valuable propaganda aims. The adamant refusal 0f 
the Federal Republic to recognize or negotiate with the Democratic Re-
public unavoidably creates) especially in certain neutralist areas subjected 
57Ibid.; p. 87. 
58 Von Oppen, pp. 597-80 
36 
to Soviet "peace dove" propaganda., the impression that the Bonn G0vern-
ment is net sincerely interested in.reunification. 
Soviet policy toward West Germany was -abruptly changed in ·1955., when 
the .S0viet Union·extended an invitation-for Chancellor Adenauer to visit· 
Moscow. Adenauer's visit ·in September, 1955 resulted in the establish-
ment of diplomatic relatio.ns between the Federal Republic ·and the ·Soviet 
Union, and als4.')·secured ·the release of several thousand German prisoners 
of war. The Seviet press generally commented.favorably on the visit of 
the West German Chancellor and openly stated that the establishment o.f re-
lations would "help settle" the problem o.f German unity. 59 
The Soviet willingness to establish diplomatic relations with the 
-Federal Republic was in sharp cantrast with its earlier position, which 
had held·the .Bonn Government to be no more than.a "puppetn·regime. The 
change in p0licy can p0ssibly be attributed to the. Seviet desire to 
"finalize" the division of Germany by recognizing both the East and the 
West Governments. Also, the .soviet Union could appear as the 11 true11 .pro-
moter of German reunification and evidence the Soviet desire to meet the 
Western.powers halfway. These two factors are not as .contradictory as 
they seem, since the Soviet Union, by recognizing both.governments, could 
more effectively urge direct ·ne_gotiation between them. It is doubtful 
whether the Soviet Union expected the Western powers to follow its lead 
and recognize the Democratic Republic. 
The-rapprochement between West Germany and the S0viet Union·did not-, 
however, bring about ·a .corresp1.mding modus vivendi between the two 
Gerrnanies. Neither did it detract from the Federal Republic's reliance 
59cf. Pravda, Septem'ber 14, 1955: Currerit Digest, 7, No. 37 
(October 26, 1955), p. 32. 
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on the Western powers. An exchange of notes between Bulganin and Adenauer 
in 1957 indicated Soviet dissatisfaction with the still uncompromising 
West German policy. Bulganin stated that: n ••.• a reunification .of 
Germany presupposes negotiations .and agreements between the two German 
Governments and, in fact, there is no other way to achieve this end.t160 
The position of the Soviet Union -remained unchanged at the Geneva 
"Summit" Conference of 1955, despite Western speculation that the es-
tablishment of diplE>matic .relations between the Soviet Union ·and the Feder-
al Republic .was a harbinger of possible Soviet compromise. The Western 
proposals were essentialy a restatement of the 1954 Eden·plan and, as be-
fore~ were unacceptable to ·the Soviet Union. An evaluation-of the Geneva 
Conference which appeared in the Soviet press well illustrated the position 
of the Soviet Union and is a forthright statement of the current Soviet 
attitude~ 
11 The representatives of the three Western powers supported 
the Paris .agreement providing for the remilitarization -of 
West Germany and her inclusion in the Western military 
grouping. Thus they did -net hide the fact that they see 
a united Germany ~nly as a part of this grouping. It is 
clear that the Soviet Union·could not and cannot agree to 
such a Mint of view for it is quite clear that it d4:11es 
not m~et the inter~~ of.Euro~ean ·securitY, .2.!: of the 
security of~ Sovi.et Unron."·I 
The Grotewohl Plan foT the creation of a German Confederation was 
enunciated in July, 1957, but contained nothing that was a departure from 
the broad Soviet p~licy of promoting direct East-West negotiationso 
Grotewohll's plan was essentially one of retaining the two separate eco-
nomic and political systems of East and West Germany, while providing 
6
~dgar Alexander; Adenauer and the New GermanL (New York, 1957), 
pp. 254-5. 
61Pravda, August 5, 1955 ~ Cu~rent Digest., 7, No. 29 (August 31, 
1955), PPo 13 ... 200 Emphasis mine. 
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for certain mutual policies and a loose all-German confederation. Such 
a confederation .was to receive the sanction of an international agree-
62 
ment. The plan specifically provided for the withdrawal of West Germany 
from NAT0 and of East Germany from the Warsaw Pact. In August, 1957, 
Soviet Premier Khrushchev supported the Grotewohl·prop0sals in an address 
before the East German Parliament in Berlin. Neither the Federal Republic 
nor the Western p0wers considered the prop0sals, 
·Evaluation.~ The p0licy of the Soviet Un.ion may be divided histori-
cally into two. periods. The first periodJ from 1945 to 1949) was .one of 
aggressive consolidation of power in East Germany and open attempts to 
force the Western powers from their position in Berlin. Confronted with 
strong Western resistance during the Berlin Blockade;9 the Soviet Union re~ 
laxed its employment of forceful means and resorted to a more subtle 
policy based on the utilization of the status quo~ namely the two German 
states. There are presently indications that the Soviet Un.ion may be 
returning to the policy pursued during the first phase. The actions of 
the Soviet Union since 1958 have grown increasingly more aggressive) es-
pecially with respect to the Western presence in Berlin. 
Soviet attempts to bring about direct neg0tiaticms between East and 
West Germany have met with no success. This has occurred despite the fact 
that the Soviet Union unilaterally acc0rded de jur_! recognition to the 
Federal Republic in 1955. Unable to· successfully promote an East-·West 
German ri!J2proichement, the Soviet Un.ion, by virtue of its steadily 
62see Heinrich von Siegler, Dokumentation ·Ell!: Deutsch1~fre._gejl 
(Bonn, 1959), p. 668. According to Grotewohl, his plan was a 11concrete111 
way to acc@mplish naie Bildung Eo;ines S:taatenbundes zwischen de!: peutschem 
Demekratischen Republik und der Deutschen Bundesrepriblik _§!.!!f d~r: Basis 
eines v~elkerrechtlichen Vertrages." 
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increasing position of power vis-a-vis the United States;i may conclude a 
separate peace treaty with the German .Democratic Republic and declare 
itself absolved of all further responsibilities with respect to Germany 
-which wel'e incurred during and after World War II. Separate action by 
the .Soviet Union would presumably be taken only if it wei-e felt that such 
a step would not ip~~.faoto mean war with the Western bloc. 
Maintenance of the status quo in Germany is for the Soviet Union, as 
it is for the Western powers, a static policy which .makes the best of an 
uneasy situation. Neither side would prefer the perpetuation of a divided 
Germany if it were passible. that one or the other; by virtue of a preponder-
ance of p0wer,; ceuld dic·tate ,:reunification terms which would bring a fully 
reunified Germany into ·its alliance system. So long as the present equi-
librium in Euro.pe continues, four-power diplomacy will postpone the solution 
of the question ·it;).f German reunification. 
CHAPTER II 
THE CHRISTIAN.DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDU) 
ANI> THE REUNIFICATION ·rssuE 
The Formulation ·ef Party Policy 
Party Characteristics~ The end of World War II found the·p0litical 
structure in Germany in a state of utter.chaos~ Quite apart from the 
disastrous effects of the war:, the -twelve years o.f Nazi rule had resulted 
in the proscription of all.p0litical parties-in Germany other than that 
of the National S0Cialist-Party itself. Political leadership was thus 
·diffused an"d·disrupted. The Western.occupation p0wer~ at first .found 
it exceedingly difficult to ·enlist the supp0rt of r~sp0nsible political 
groups. The United States Military GQvernment in Germany did not actively 
-promote and sanction the organization of p0litical groups and parties un-
til after the Potsdam.Protocol in August, 1945.1 Between May and August 
the .Soviet o-ccupation ·officials had already sanctioned the .zonal organi-
zation -~f four:pl@liticalparties~ 2 The Western occupational amalgamation 
1Article. II..9. (ii-) of the Potsdam. Protacel provided that "all demo-
c-ratic p0litical parties with rights -ef as.senibly and ,ef pti1'>lic .discussion 
shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germa·ny.'' The .first authori-
zation by the United States fo·r the formation ·af poli tic.;il. parties in the 
American :•zone of occupation -was given in a di,recti ve issued on August -27·, 
1945. For a ·description of pelitical evolution in West Germany during 
this early -period, see U. S. De.pt. of Statej Office of the United States 
High Commissioner for Germany (hereafter.,referred ·to as U. s. High Com-
missioner), State ,and LQcal Government ·in West Germany,· 19'45-12~ (1953). 
2These four· were the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party.9 
the Christian Democratic Un:ion·and the Liberal Democratic .Party. In 1946 
the Communist and Sec·ial Democratic parties .were fused into one, the 
Socialist Unity Party. 
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programs of pi-zonia and tri-zonia -compensated somewhat for this early 
Soviet lead in p0litica1 organization, as the operation and efficacy of 
parties in West Germany were·geographically,facilitated. 
The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was .organized in 1946. Al-
though partially a descendent of the old Catholic Center Party, which had 
been dissolved in 19-33~ the CDU was .clrganized on a. broader basis and de-
signed to afford more of ·an ·appeal to .a heterogeneous electorate. Es-
tablished as a Christian party, the CDU encompassed .Protestants as well 
as Catholics~ The latter, however 3 have constituted a preponderant ma-
jority of the membership, especially-in certain areas of s.outhern Germany. 
A Bavarian affiliate of the party .is known as the Christian Social Union 
(CSU}, acc,ounting ,for the official dual designation of the party, the 
CDU-CSU. ·rnasmuch as the affiliate CSU is .highly parechial and largely 
·limited to Bavarian domestic politics; this Chapter is hereafter concerned 
only with the CDU. 
Certain factors peculiar to the founding of the CDU have had con-
siderable influence on ·the.party's fll)reign _p0licy approach. As early as 
1946, the broad ©utlines of the.party's Western.E,rientation were already 
established. The.present Chancellor of the Federal Republic; K0nrad 
Adenauer, was m10Jst influential in determining the framework within which 
the CDU, as the Gevernment party after 1949, formulated its Aussenpolitik. 
There was no disagreement amimg party leaders· in 1946 as to the desirability 
of cooperation with the Western powers. Despite the fact that a CDU group 
was organized in the Soviet zone in June., 1945, party officials unani-
mously rejected any orientation·ef Germany to the East. There were.1 how-
ever, differences of opinion as ta which of the Western powers sh@uld be 
most courted. .Dr. Schlange-Schoeningen, an influential party leader, 
favored CDU reliance on Great Britain, especially with respect to foreign 
42 
policy matters. On the other hand, Dr. Adenauer and his group stressed 
the necessity of reaching an·immediate accord with France:, the traditional 
enemy, in order to insure continental solidarity. Prominent in Adenauer's 
thinking was the rectification of outstanding Franco-German enmities-. To 
this end, the "concept of Europe" appeared in 1946 and has continued to 
dominate CDU foreign ·p0licy in general and reunification ·proposals speci-
fically. 3 
In contrast to early foreign -policy assertions by the Social Demo-
crats~ the CDU generally appeared to take more of a realistic viewpoint 
and recognized the imp"'ssibility of accomplishing any foreign policy ob-
.jectives while Germany ·still remained under stern occupation. The main 
emphasis cif the CDU was on "peaceful co.operation11 with ether nations to 
overcome the exigencies of the times. 4 This early adv0cacy of European 
accord and consensus has been consistently maintained in the bases of CDU 
p0licy on the reunification question. 
For CDU leaders the issue of reunification was already a cause for 
· concern by 1947. A meeting held -in Berlin prior to the Lond0n Conference 
of Foreign Ministers was attended by several prominent Christian Demo-
crats who later received.positions in the Adenauer Government. A reso-
lution,issued at the conclusion of the meeting contained the .following 
demands g 
"· •• the partici,pation -1.:lif responsible and expert repre-
sentatives of the German people in the preparation and conclusion 
3Cf. Hans G. Wieck, Die Eritstehuqg der CDU und die Wiedergruendung 
des Zentrums ~ .Tahre 1945) ·(Benn.9 · 1953), p. 225·. 
4cf. Wolfgang Treue.9 Deutsche Parteiprogramme 3 1861-1956, (Goettingen.9 
1956.}.9 p. 185. From the Programm fu Christlich-Demokratischen Union der 
britischen Zorle:i Nehe:im.;.Hueste:n.9 March.l, 1946. 
of a peace treaty 'is indispensable. The German people 
demand that they be regarded as a-p0l\tical entity. 
They demand that a statute be adopted to regulate the 
relationships between the occupa.tion-powers-and Germany 
as .a whole .tr5 
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CDU · participation in making such 11demands'.' was, of cours.e; entirely in-
f orma1. .On the whole; ·the .Christian Dem0crats were officially quiescent 
with respect to Western pelicy and actions. 
It should be pe:iinted l:l!Ut; falwever, that political party restraint 
was not entirely a matter of comity. The United States Military Govern-
ment in Germany had always been ill-disposed toward p0litica1 critic.ism. 
Shortly after the conclusion of the Londan Conf e,rence in 1948, several 
policy directives were set forth .which affected the actions of p01itical 
parties-in West Germany. Political parties were given the right to 
participate in free discussion of issues relevant to ·the German people 
and the wierld as a.whll)le but were ferbidden·to engage in criticism of 
Allied·decisions as .set forth in conferences and in ·the Control Council. 
Perha·ps the mest. stringent, of these prohibitions· did not long stand the 
test of time: members of German political parties ·were required to re-
frain from statements which "spread rumors aimed at disrupting unity 
amongst the Allies-, or which caused distrust and a hostile attitude on 
the part .of the German . people toward any of the occupying pewers ., n6 
The CDU position '.in this respect was generally cast in a favorable light 
due to the party's pro-Western ~rientation. The SPD, on the other hand, 
did not hesitate to engage in criticism under the leadership @f the 
5Hans Speier and W. Philli-ps Davison, eds • ., West German Leadersh:iJ! 
an~ Foreign PolicL . (Evanston, · 1957), · pp. 16-17 ·• 
6u. S. Dept. of State; GermaQY.1947-'1949, The Story in Documents. 
Eur@pean an.d Briti_sh _C@l'timonw~alth Series; Publ. No. 3556 (March, 1950), 
p. 160~ Title 3, Part 4, Military Government Regulations. 
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vociferous Kurt Schumacher~ who often castigated Allied eccupation ·poli-
cies and the divisions they created. 
By ,1949, then, the Christian Demecrats were equipped with a body of 
viable general principles which were flexible enough to acconnnodate 
·specific policies when they became the Government party. Under the de 
fact~ leadership of Konrad Adenauer7 the party was well regarded by the 
Western occupation auth@rities and was considered to be democratic and 
stable. Moreover~ the CDU was seen as a party which could be relied on 
. for·responsible leadership in the event that reunification could be 
achieved by four-p~~agreement. Especially amenable to the Western 
authorities was the CDU advocacy of a federal stateJ rather than a unitary 
or CQ)nfederated form of government.8 The "Christian" characteristics of 
the party and its distinctly pro-Western orientation were likewise con-
sidered to be valuable factors in furthering Western p01icy aims in 
Germany. In view of these attributes, the CDU, by 1949, was clearly ac-
corded the nmost-favored-party'~ acc.olade by the Western powers. 
Effect of Electoral Success~ The Christian Dem(;)cratic Party secured 
approximately·31 percent of the votes cast in·the 1949 elections)) only 
slightly more than the support received by the S0cia1 Democrats (29 percent). 
The s.ubsequent election years of 1953 and 1957 greatly increased the CDU 
vote but the SPD remained approximately the same (only 32 percent in 1957)" 
7The CDU was organized only on a Land level until the first general 
party congress held at Gos1ar in October; 1950. Adenauer was elected 
chairman of the CDU at this congressJ thus becoming only at that time 
the recognized leader of the "national" party organization" Party claims 
of all-German.legitimacy were furthered by the presence of delegates from 
East Germany arid the eastern territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line. 
Cf" Weymar, ppo "346....:.7 o 
8see U. S. High ConnnissionerJ Information Bulletin, No. 170 
(September 20J 1949h PPo 19-2L 
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In 1953 the Christian Democrats increased their plurality by approximately 
15 percent and, in 1957, they secured a simple majority for the .first thne 
( 500 2 percent). 9 Although elected Chancellor by the slim margin of one 
vote in 1949, Dr" Adenauer was decisively retained in that office after 
the two succeeding elections. CDU control of the Federal Government, de~ 
spite temp0irary setbacks:, had obviously met with approval on the part of 
the elect@rateo Twelve ye:ars of Christian Democratic Gl;lvernment have n0t, 
h0wiever, brought about the reunification IQlf Germanyo Such failure can~ 
fr@rn an objective p~int ©f view, be attributed to the East..,.West deadlock 
and the mutually unacceptable reunification proposals of the Soviet Union 
and the Western pli)werso But:, quite naturally, the analysis of p01itical 
opponents rarely attains any degree of objectivity, The CDU has been 
subjected to bitter criticism by members of.the Opposition.i chiefly the 
Social Democratic Partyo 
Considering the extreme importance of the reunification issue in West 
German political life)) the fact that the Government party has been unable 
to achieve concrete results necessarily means that the CDU must constantly 
justify-its lack of acc®rnplishm.:ent. Even in view of circumstances which 
have made it virtually imp0ssible for a pro-Western party like the CDU to 
carry out any acceptable plan of reunification, there can be .no careless-
ness or flippancy in the face of this .criticisrno However.9 opposition to 
the Geivernment's plf.llicies has not been entirely detrimental to the CDU. 
Despite the p0ssibility ~f arranging a CDU-SPD Government coalition9 
the Christian DemEJlc.rats have not been especially desirous of doing so o 
Attributing the slim electoral victory in 1949 to a rejection of a planned 
economy by the peopleJ Chancellor Adenauer stated that it would be thus 
9rercentages given have been taken from Kitzinger., Po 60 
46 
"undem0cratic" to criticize the Gavernment ,for net including the SPD. 
Adenauer further stated in ·1949 that there was a· definite need for an 
organized oppositien.10 Although SPD criticism has caused the CDU con-
siderable discomfert, it would appear that this same oppositien-has often 
facilitated the suc·cessful .formulation ·0f Chancellor Adenauer11 s foreign 
. policy. This is especially true in the matter of reunification policy. 
The CDU has st@Elld exceptionally close to the pesition -of the Western 
powers and -this has sometimes restricted the sphere of CDU action. The 
SPD, much more free in pr9posing reunification means, has striven te 
place its alternative _pr€>posals before the German public.. In occasional 
periods of Government .flexibility, the CDU has .found the electorate ac-
quainted with these other policy means and has had the opp0rtunity to 
offer its ®wn ~~~tion 111£ them, claiming the credit for any resulting 
·success.11 Consequently, it is with good reason that Chancellor Adenauer 
has stated that "a coalition-with the Social Democrats would only·in-
crease the .difficulties of the G0vernment.nl2 
Apart .from unsolicited stimulation :by the Social Democrats, the CDU 
coalition partners have-sometimes departed from the Government reunifi-
cation plilllicy. Againp the ,smaller parties ·have been less rigid than the 
CDU and ,have ssmetimes St:lpp@rte.d variations in p0licy. .In the case of 
the Free Dem0cratic Parity (FDP) too much variance resulted and they eventu-
ally left the Government coa1ition°in 1956 for a combination of reasons. 
CDU electoral success has been,qualified •. Even the CDU majerity 
10 See Foreign Radio Broadcastsjl No. 182 (September 21.il 1949L Secthm 
QQ. 
11 
Cf. Speier and Davison, p. -54. 
12Foreign Radio Broadcasts, No. 65 (April 4, 1950), Sect. QQ. 
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-obtained in·the .1957 election has n-at been without its drawbacks .. Always 
·character:i,zed as authoritarian, the Adenauer-Gavernment was increasingly 
attacked by Opposition members wha -feared that the Chanceller would uti-
lize his .party majority-in the Bundestag to .force through any and all 
measures. .Conversely, -the CDU .was -no longer able to ·readily · charge off 
p0licy failure to the "op-position·threat.n13 The Christian Democrats were 
to fall or ·rise on their own in ·the elections of · 1961-. 14 
The alignment .of the ·CDU with the Western-reunification ·position has 
also ·benefited the party~ s p0li ti cal for-tunes. .The ·propaganda organs of · 
the Soviet Union-have censistent1y directed-torrents of abuse toward West 
. Germany, and the Government party •in f)articular. Far :frI>m wilting under 
this onslaught, the Christian Democrats have profited from it. A sue-
cessful party image .has been constructed which proclaims that ."we are the 
particular ene~y of your enemy." The Social Democrats, too, have been 
subjected to considerable abuse by the Soviet Union, but they·have not 
projected as clear a reflection to the German public. Adenauer's person-
al image .has dame much .for the party ·in this respect, as he has become 
the persimification -~f West German reunification ·hapes through his con-
stantly reiterated phrase of ''Einheit in Frieden :und Freiheit" (unity 
in peace .and freedom). The Chancellor's merally-pitched reunification 
slogans-have contrasted fav-erably with ·the blunt language used by S0viet 
s.pekesmen. The wild -epithets .hurled by the Soviet Union have been ·des-
· cribed as influencing many Ge,rmans to s:ee a "confirmation -of Adenauer's 
13cf. Speier and Davisen., p. -54~ "· •• the success of the CDU 
• weakened the bargaining power of the Chancellor." 
14For an account and analysis of the 1953 and 1957 elections., re-
s.pectively, see Ja~es. K. Pallock, ed •. ,· German De~0~raci at Work, · (Michigan, 
1955), and u. W. Kitzinger., 9.erman Electeral Politics., Oxford, 1960). 
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claim that he was defending the faith against the infidels. 1115 
The reunification position of the CDU vis-a-vis the SPD has gener-
ally been more substantive in its appeal to the voters. Despite oc-
casional ambiguities, CDU reunification policy has been far more positive 
in content than that of the SPD and has been forthright and readily under-
standable, The strong identification with the Western p0wers and their 
position has created no doubt as to ·.·fill!! the p0licies of the CDU have 
been, Unlike the S0cial Democrats, the CDU has had the great advantage 
of standing firmly and consistently with a bloc of nations who constitute 
half of the bi-polar distribution of power. Althaugh free from·such en-
tanglements, SPD reunification policies have nevertheless been more nega-
tive in character. It is an apparent fact that CDU policy has not resulted 
in constructive steps toward reunification, but it must be pointed out that 
half of the world sharers this p0licy and stands ready to justify its con-
tinued application. The SPD cannot claim such wide acceptance of its pro-
posals ana must therefore be highly defensive in promoting them. 
The original electoral success of the CDU has been perpetuated by 
an Opposition which appears indecisive and isolated to the voters, The 
most bitter policy protestations of the Social Democrats have therefore 
bounced off the shield of assurance held by the CDU. And, altht:mgh of 
declining importance, they have enabled the Christian Dem0crats to piously 
assert that nthe CDU has had to struggle against an embittered 0pposition 
15Grant S. McClellan)> The Two Germanies, {New York, 1959), p. 52~ 
"Stumping the country, Adenauer kept telling the people he was crusading 
for Christianity against corrnnunism. At the same time Nikita Khrushchev 
was touring East Germany uncil.er the auspices of the Red government there 
and sht1mting that Adenauer was a warmonger and an American stooge." 
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on every stretch of its foreign policy.nl6 
The Party Position on Reunification 
Dependen~ £!! the Western R':)Wers: The strong pro-Western 0rienta-
tion of the CDU has brought about a ftill commitment of party policy to 
Western reunification policy in general. Politically, econamically and 
militarily, the CDU is firmly bound to the fate of the Western allia.nceJ 
specifically the United States. 
During its first years as the Government party, the CDU coiuld do 
little more than echo the pronouncements of Western statesmen, However, 
the increasing p@litical stability of the party vis-a-vis its ·Chief 
oppesition, the Social Democrats, produced a change in this role of mere 
repetition. Alth8ugh the lines of entanglement have not allowed sub-
stantial CDU policy.divergence, the Adenauer Government has emerged as 
the most revisionistic spokesman for German reunification in the Western 
Bloc. This did n0t evolve as naturally as it might seem. 
Obviously, the German people are most intimately committed to their 
own reunificatfono H0wever, in view of the original four-power respon~ 
sibility.for achieving a reconstituted all-German state.i a less vigorous 
leadership could) have deemphasized Government activity relating to re-
~·~ 
unification and left the matter to be an exclusive concern @f the Western 
pci-wers and the Soviet Urti(5)n, The CDU has been principally resp@nsible 
for building the issue of reunification into a national obsession 0f the 
·first magnitude. Retrospectively, Chancellor Adenauer possessed unusual 
foresight in leading this buildup. The German people had been subjected 
tEi countless manufactured nis:sues" during the Nazi regime and were wholly 
16see Treue, p. 252. 
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disenchanted with p0litical spectaculars .after World War II. Even at the 
time of the creation <;>f the Federal Republic in 1949:, political apathy 
was widespread. 
Adenauer's Government had necessarily .found itself to be .a de nova 
political entity ta the German.people and.prospects for continued CDU 
leadership appeared marginal. If the Federal Government had merely con-
cerned itself with-the burgeoning domestic problems, and had pursued a 
vicinal pelicy approach, it is entirely possible that palitical vicissi-
tudes weiuld have ended the CDU exercise of p0wer. The extreme fervor 
with which Adenauer immediately moved fully behind the question ·.af German 
un:ity appears to .have been a Realpelitik maneuver of the first order. Be-
fore the ,elections of 1953, Konrad Adenauer had come to symbolize the 
.principle of self-determination to the people of Germany and to the 
·nations of the world. This transference was extended to include the CDU 
as .a. party and the results of the 195:3 elections attested to its success. 
The original reliance of the CDU on Western policy has become 
partially converted to·a reliance of the Western bloc on the power po-
tential of West Germany. This ·has enhanced the status of the ,Federal 
Republic and CDU leadership 'has been quick to exploit this increased 
prestige. This efficacious stimulation by the Western powers brought 
the CDU tea new pinnacle of electoral success in 1957 and the trend 
has continued. 
Despite the successful CDU prasecution.of Western ties, and the at-
tainment of near equal status on matters relating to German reunification 
and the Berlin issue; the aggressive character of Christian Democratic 
reunification p0lic:y.may have run its full course. The p0wer p0sition 
of the Soviet Union has evolved ta a paint where •the revisionist policy 
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of the CDU may well become an unwelcome liability to the Western powers 
in their attempts to reach a face-saving and peaceful solution 0f the 
German question. Any significant deviation ef Western policy from the 
present course would have serious ·political·repercus.sions in the Federal 
Republic. The CDU has staked its very existence on the c0ntinuance of 
the containment policy and it can be assumed that it would consider drastic· 
measures to maintain its p10sition of leadership in the Federal Republic. 
Par!X .Objectives·~ 
nr shl!,mld, at any time prefer a free united Germany.:, with the 
S01cialists as the strongest party, to a Federal Republic separated 
from the S0viet Zone.:, with the CDU as the strongest party. In 
this issue the fatherland and the .nation really stand above party 
issues-, and the statesman begins where the party politician ends. 
Regarding the all-German iss:uej there is na such thing as a CDU 
policy or a Cath0lic policy, 1117 
This statement was made by Chancellor Adenauer shortly before the 1953 
elections .i in response to alle.gations that the CDU had everything to gain 
and ncthing to lose from the ·continued disruption of German unity, The 
Christian Democrats have been extremely sensitive to such criticism and 
the amount of party verbiage which exists with respect to the aims and 
objectives of the G@vernment bears out this concern, It is precisely 
this that makes an analysis of the ,real obje.cti ves of the CDU a difficult 
task of separation, No political party or aspirant to public office in 
the Federal Republic c@uld afford to slight the goal of German reunifi~ 
cation, As indicated, ·this has been the antithesis of CDU actions since 
1949, 
Any Government tract on reunification affords an ample view of the 
party's official p0sition with respect to reunification. There are sever~· 
al points of emphasis which are constantly reiterated, First-, the CDU 
17 Qm:ited in Weymarj p. 467, 
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wants the reunification of Germany in "peace and freedem." Often ac-
cempanying this is the stated requisite that reunification can only be 
-secured in a "unified and. free" Europe. The use of. force as a means of 
accomplishing reunification has been rejected repeatedly by Adenauer, but 
this has -been necessitated by-the .fear of the ,growing military and-eco-
nomic ·.power of the Federal Republic. .This increase 0f West German. p0wer 
-has created misgivings about a .po-ssible recourse to arms by the Ger.mans. 
The key p0sition·of West Germany·in the NAT0 alliance has been a relished 
accomplishment of the CDU3 carried out in the face of obstinate ,p0litical 
opp@sition. The Weste.rn p~wers provided the impetus for German rearmament 
and the CDU .has vigoreusly executed it. 
The special problem created by a divided Berlin has likewise be.en 
constantly thrust before ·the German.public ,by .the CDU, as well as the 
Oppasition. ·Chancellor Adenauer stands -adamantly opposed to the Soviet 
.proposals to make an fflinterna·tional free city" out -of West Berlin ·and 
has .again and again stated that there can be -ne s0luti0n to ·the Berlin 
_problem .without a ".general relief of tension.rrl8 CDU ·appeals to ·the 
Berlin and East German p0pulaces have been ardent and frequent. Through 
the activities 0f the Federal.Ministry of All-German Affairs-, the Adenauer 
~vernment directs .a canst-ant ·stream.of propaganda-eastward and\courts 
the thf)usands of refugees wh0 have fled to the ,Federal RepU:blic.19 Al ... 
though some Germans have ,become comfortably complacent about-reunification, 
18see .Press Office) _German _Diplornati.c Miss.ion, . Washington, 1:h .c ... ., 
Collected Speeche.s;9 Statements, Press'.9 Radio:!!!! TV'Inter.views ~ Dr. 
Konrad Adenauer; p. 86. 
19For examples of some particular concerns of this Ministry, see. 
Press and Information Office of the German F-ederal Government (here-
after referred to as German Information .,Offic.e), T}).e Bulletin, 9 (April 
196lh pp •. ' 1-2. 
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the enormous number.of refugees, who find it difficult to become settled 
in steady circumstances, have been most restless and demanding with re-
spect to reunification.20 
The original success of the CDU in projecting itself as the champion 
of German.unity has created a problem of explaining why this paramount 
objective has net been realized. The CDU has generally been quite skill-
ful in parrying such questions. The most widely used means has been to 
attribute the failure of German reunification ·to the Soviet Union. Foreign 
Minister von BrentanQl stated in 1957 that~ 
nThe fact that the Federal Government has s.o .far been 
unable tlf)) effect the reunification of Germany does net prove 
that our·policy is wrong. S0 long·as the Soviets refuse to 
grant reunification at a price other than freed0m, there 
exists no practical way toward national unity.11.21 
Pointing to the Soviet intransigence!J the CDU has add.ed a note of caution 
to its reunificati0n position" The familiar slogan of "reunification in 
peace and. freedomlV has been lengthened to include the requirement that 
nour way requires a great deal of time and patience:, faith and per-
sistence o tv 22 This has been rather easily accomplished since the CDU has 
never decelerated the reunification buildup. Even in the face of current 
uneasiness about the outcome of the Berlin situation~ the recent CDU 
party congress held in ColegneJ April 24-27, 1961~ again proclaimed its 
traditional creed~ 1vthe right of self-determination for all Germans, the 
20Alth~mgh the refugees organized a p0litical party 0f their own~ 
the Gesamtdeutscher ]3locly'Block de:i:: Heimatvertriebenen und. :i<:n:triec;hteten 
(G.ff.7B.H.E.), the CDU and the SPD have largely won their supporto The 
G.B./B.H.E. received n0 seats in the 1957 Bunde~tago The party has mainly 
constituted an interest group and it is the CDU desire to appeal to their 
reunification desiresJ including rep0ssession of the eastern territories 
past the Oder-Neisse line. 
21 Quoted in Alexander, pp. 274-5, 
22rb'd 
~O;) 
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freed0m of the German -capital, Berlin, and the -reunification -of Germany 
in peace a mil freedom. n23 The maintenance of . peace, h0wever, is not in-
sured by the present intransigent position. 
The stated reunification 'aims and objectives of the Gevernment party 
are .but one· side ef the coin. It is quite true that many· membe,rs of the 
CDU, · especially the party rank and .file, ·earnestly believe in and labor 
strenu0usly to perpetuate ·the party-pesition on reunification. The top 
leadership 0f the .party, however; may·net be as -sincere in its motives. 
The basis af the CDU reunificati0n p0sition has been its .uncampro-
mising moral posture. The reunification 'issue has become a great humani-
tarian movement in the .eyes of the world and the Federal Gevernment has 
striven to maintain that. character. Cynical criticism of the real poli-
tical motives of West German.politicians has been countered.with a moral 
rebuttal by Government sp0kesrnen. The present ambas.sador of the Federal 
Republic to the United States .recently ·stated tha·t, "The assumption :that 
the .prolonged division ·Cf Germany finds widespread sympathy in Western 
Germany.·is wrong.n24 Such ,a denial was explained as follows: 
"It is the .fundamental conviction that a nation which 
~uld be prepared to abandon :its .own pa-rents or children, ,its 
· brothers ar ·sisters in a state of brutal slavery, ·in order 
tg safeguard (T€sown. ·prosperity and security, would be 
. contempti b1e • • • Such a na·tion · would lose its .h0nor·. "25 
Irrespective of lost h0n0r, it appear,s that there are m0re -basic poli-
tical reasons for the ceurse 0f CDU,reunification ·p0licy. 
As a successful.palitical group, the Christian Democratic leaders 
238 ( ) ee German .Information Office; The Bulletin, 9 May 2, 1961 ., p. 3. 
24wilhelm G. Grewe;; "The Unification of Germany,"'The Annals of the 
American · Aca@m,y . of Peli ti cal and . Social Science, 324 (July, 19 59), ·. pp. 
10-11. 
25Ibld .• 
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are naturally desirous of continuing their domination of the .Federal Re-
public, But their situation is quite distinct from that of leadership 
cliques in other countries. Unlike the other leading nations of the 
world.9 the Federal Republic is a recent creation of international fiat. 
M0re precisely; it owes its existence to the East-West struggle for p0wer 
and was therefore instituted amidst international disharmony. The CDU, 
as the Government party) ch0se to identify itself to the German people as 
a symb0l of protest against this disharmony. There have been formidable 
dQlmestic .problems to face and overcome in West Germany since 1949. The 
CDUJ of course~ has devoted considerable attention to reconstructing the 
shattered face of post=war Germany, But even the econ0mic approach of 
the party, such as the highly successful soziale Marktwirtschaft program 
of Ludwig Erhard, has been subordinated to the partyis preoccupation with 
the reunification issueo 
The CDU has abviously been successful in appearing as the nsavior11 
of the German peopleo Despite the opportunity to support the vastly 
different reunification views of the Social Democrats, the West German 
· voters have Cl(l)nsistently.returned the CDU to an increasing prep0nderance 
of p0litical p0wero By deing so they enabLe the CDU to claim a nmandate" 
from the people for its objectives o.f strong Western ties.? continued re-
armament and European unification·. 
In summary., then~ the CDU has turned the reunification issue into a 
national obsession and has furthermore succeeded in perpetuating its 
electoral supremacy by purp0rting to be the panacea of the disunity sick-
nesso It is correct to assume that the Christian Democrats would solidly 
support the actual achievement of German unity if this were to be ob-
tained .on the basis of the current Western positiono A position o.f leader-
ship in an all~German state would be vastly superior to that occupied by 
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the party ·in West Germany alone. It is with this .in mind that the .par;-ty 
.has intended its .ardent ·support -o.f German reunifica:tion to be a factor of 
influence on the .East Germans as well as the West Germans. The CDU -is 
well aware of the .fact that EastGermany·is pred0minantly.Protestan:t and 
might afford millions sf additional v0tes .for the SPD in the .event of 
· reunification. Hawever:~ the ·.expanded spher·e ·0f power which would ·result 
from the reunification-0f Germany would be worth·the .electoral risk in-
curred. The CDU, in ~its passionate appeals to the "savagely appressed" 
people of East Germany, has s0ught to minimize this risk. The Germans 
residing in the Democratic Republic have, since 1949,·constantly received 
the full attention-of CDU political leaders. On ·accasions of West German 
accomplishment, the ."brothers"·to the East have ·not been forgotten. One 
·example suffices to inaica te the perf ervid nature of such ·remembrances. 
On the occasien af the restorati0n ,o.f West German -sovereignty in 1955, 
Adenauer's address included the.follewing: 
"Together with the .Federal Government, fifty million .free 
citizens of the Federal Republic are -at this h0ur thinking 
· in brotherly·love of millions ef-other Germans who are still 
forced to dwell, separated from us, in thraldom and·lawless-
ness. We call to them~ you·are part .of us and we beleng to 
. y0u. .Our j0y at having).regained :our ·freedom will be over-
. shadowed as .long as~Fifs.freedemis denie-d to y0u. You may 
·forever rely on us, ferp together with-the free world, we 
· shall not rest until. y0u too ·have .regained .your human .rights 
and -live peacefully united with us in ·ane state and as .one 
nation. n26 · 
The eastern territories, pa·s,t the Oder=Neisse line ,are .similarly courte.d. 
Despite the advantages of occupying a p0sition ·of p0wer in an all-
German.state-; the CDU .will never agree to any·reunification ·proposal 
which does not allow the ·free exercise of that power. It is thus un-
alterably opposed·to th0se reunification ,plans of the Boviet Union°which 
26--
-weymar, p .. 488. 
57 
have sought the complete neutralization 0f a reunited Germany. For the 
same reason; Chancellor Adenauer and the leaders of the CDU have oppesed 
any change in Western policy which :would endorse "disengagement" and seek 
to make a buffer .state out of a reunited Germany. Such a policy would 
necessarily mean mutual proscription of German p0wer by the East and the 
West, Consequently, the CDU obje.ctive of enhancing its power pesitien 
could not be realized andJ in factJ the political leaders of a neutralized 
Ge·:rmany would enjoy even less p0wer than they now possess in the Federal 
Republic" 
Such conclusions with respect to the ~alpolitik objectives of the 
CDU are, of coursep interpretive. The G0vernment leaders have not openly 
stated such aims. To de ·SG would necessarily constitute political suicide 
for the party. On at least one occasion9 however, Chancellor Adenaueris 
p0sition seemed to substantiate these conclusions, Alarmed by the pros-· 
pects of a Western acceptance of a neutralized all-German buffer state, 
the Chancellor indicated the .following at a press conference in 1957~ 
tuThe neutralization -of a reunified Germany 3 • • • and 
the setting up of an international control body, would make 
Germany a mere pawno ~~ • , • f is_] £2.! interested i!! 
becoming~ second pate p~er.,n27 
Whatever it:s real objectives, the CDU has relentlessly continued to 
utilize a highly effective political formula which wraps the potent issue 
of national reunification in a blanket of righte0us moralism, The CDU 
will not c@mpromise oin the present Western p~sition regarding German re-
unification,28 This would jeopardize .political objectives of long standing. 
27cf. Siegler3 The Reunification and Security of g.!rmany3 p. 182. 
Emphasis mine, 
28For a recent restatement of the Government position, see German 
Information Officej) 'I'he Bulletin3 9 (June 13 3 1961). 
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The Adenauer Government is :firmly committed to all-aspects of current 
Western p0licy an,d-, · irrespective of endangered objectives of increased 
political power; ~ny change would have serious repercussions for ·the CDU. 
Western recognition-of the German Democratic Republic alone would consti-
tute an enormous -defeat -for the Christian Democrats. Although the SPD 
has -accepted the ~in lines of the Government's reunification-p0sition, 
it remains a highly v~ca1 Oppo.sitien-which .W()uld net hesitate to capital-
ize electorally on ,any breach in-the present pelicy ·framework. 
The CDU is fully aware of the untenable _pl@sition which it·would 
occuw if the Western powers .compromised 0n -Soviet prop0sals. The ex-
tent of ·its .intransigence is well indicated by a rec.ent. p0licy statement 
of Chancellor Adenauer. · Returning to the ,Federal Republic ·from a visit 
to the President -of the United States, the Chancellor ·stated .on April 
27:j 1961p that~ 
"Germany and Berlin can---and of this I am certain, rely 
on·the pledges which the Americans have given tE) protect the 
.freed~m of Berlin. The foundations 0n which ·the Federal 
G0vernment'-s p0lioy with regard to Germany has rested since 
1949j a policy with which our allies solemnly as.sociated 
themselves in the Paris -conventions; remain unaltered. A 
just and enduring sQllution for the problem of Germany, 
. including Berlin, is ·.p,lssible only on 'the basis of the right of 
self-determinatilCln. The ·restoration of Germany's unity in 
peace and fre·edom remains the goal of our .joint policy .t,29 
·Proposals and Pelicie~·g The: primary point of emphasis in ·this 
Chapter has been the p0litical objectives of the CDU. The close re-
lationship Gf the Adenauer Government to the Wes·tern powers has· meant 
that the reunification ·prop0sals ami. policies of ·the Christian Democrats 
.have necessarily paralleled those -of the West·. The main distinc·tion to 
be nQlted is the .vigoreus way ·inwhich·the CDU has prometed the Western 
29Press .Office of the German Embassy, News from ·the Ger111.an EmbassL 
5 {April 21, ·1961}, p. 1. 
proposals. Of special concern i s the CDU espousal of safeguards and 
qualifications to these proposals, rather than a presentation of com-
plet e reunification plans set forth by the party. 
r--..... 
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The Christian Democrats have een most aggressive in promoting the 
Western policy of "negotiation from strength." The -rearmament of the 
Federal Republic and its inclusion in the NATO alliance have been "sold" 
to the German people by the CDU . Adenauer has constantly maintained that 
the Soviet Union "would negotiate on the question of German unity only 
with a strong partner . 1130 Such a policy stands in glaring contrast to 
the position of t he SPD in this r espect, but it has apparently been more 
appealing t o the electorate in its positive approach . 31 As seen, neutral-
ism has nothing to offer the CDU in its desire to increase the power status 
of Germany . It has , therefore, gladly championed the military participa-
tion of Wes t Germany in the Western alliance . The constant admonishments 
of the CDU that the West must "stand firm" seem quite inconsistent with 
its equally repetitious blandishments that Christian Democratic policy 
"has no agressive character . 11 32 
The CDU , together with the SPD, has adamantly r efused to r ecognize 
the Oder - Neisse line as a final boundary between Germany and Poland . 33 
The West ern power s, in repudiating East Ge·rman legitimacy, have been 
l ess concerned with the Polish and Russian annexations of the eas tern 
territories than the Christian Democrats . Adenauer, of course, denies 
the validity of the East German regime as .such, but has specifically 
castigated its recognition of the eas tern boundaries as a permanent situ-
ation . Understandably, direct negotiations between East and We s t Germany 
would be highly complicated by this sensitive issue alone. The Federal 
Bundestag ha s be-en particularly vocal with respect t o the eas tern terri-
tories and CDU and SPD plans of r eunification must necessarily deal with 
30Quoted in Weymar:, .p. 342 . Adenauer went on to say that " . • • a 
weak partner in negotiation would merely be an invitation to the Soviets 
to take ·agressive action . " 
31Cf . Horne, p. 221 . 
32see Treue, p . 251 . Contained in Programm der CDU, Hamburg , April 
22, 1953 . 
33For ·an early s tatement of the party' s policy regarding the Oder-
Neisse line, see Wilhelm Monunsen, Deutsche f_arteiprogranune : Eine Auswahl 
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their restitution., 34 
The CDU has consistently upheld the essential points of reunification 
· contained in a BundestB;_g resolution of June 10-, 1953~ as follows: 
1. 
2. 
Germany, 
The holding of free elections throughout Germany; 
the formation of a free Government for the whole of 
3. the conclusion of a peace treaty that has be.en freely 
negotiated with that G.0vernment, 
4, the settlement of all outstanding territorial questions 
·by that peace treaty; 
5. the guaranteeing to an.all=German Parliament.and an all-
German G0ve·rnment of freedem of action consistent :with the 
principles and purposes .of the United Nations, 35 
As is evident)) this reunification -outline .corresponded to the prop0sals 
later made by British Foreign Secretary Eden at the Berlin Conference in 
1954, Adenauer's response to the outcome of the Berlin Conference was to 
urge further cons.olidation ·of Western power in Europe. Attributing the 
-failure of the .conference ta the lack of agreement on world problems in 
general 9 Adenauer also stated that the .Federal Government would welcome 
"every attempt to eliminate the sources of conflict in (;)ther parts .of·the 
world since such easing of tension·would inevitably have its effect on 
the German question o i~36 AgainJ these two comments were somewhat incon-
sistent. 
·.Y2[! Yi®rmaerz bis zur: Geg_enwart) (Munich, 1952), p. 154. This is an 
account of the Grundsaet~e der cng/Q§Q Deutschlands ~ 1950 J ~,tl,+.,ung 
· des ~~tariats dil:l!:, ~U, Also see We.ymarJ p, 292~ ancl .. ·· 
Adenauerw s speech before :the Bun9~ of October 21~ 1949, ,contained 
in Bundesministerium.fuer Gesamtdeutsche Fragen~ Die B~muehungen der· 
Bund.esrepublik .!!!!! Wiederh_erstellugg ill Eirtheit Deutschland-s durch 
Gresamtdeutsche: Wahlen 9 pp. 7-9. · 
34 . 
FiDr an early Bundestag pronouncement on the Oder~Neisse linej 
see Heinrich von Sieglerj Wiedervereinigung und Sicherheit Deutschlandsj 
(Bonn, 1958)J PPo 176...;7, 
35Ibid. J p~ 188, 
36 See Adenauer, Wor:lg,:Indiv.:!:sible~ pp, ·105~6. 
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Two aspects of CDU policy have received detailed attention. These are 
insuring free elections and the connection ·established by Adenauer between 
German reunification ami European unity and security. The former appears 
·to have caused some alarm.for the Adenauer Government with respect to 
possible Western compromise on the .safeguards involved. Adenauer has 
.frequently·referred'tothe guarantees required in various notes to the 
. Western p@we:rs-. 37 The M@letav propll.:llsals at the Berlin Conference in no 
way placated the CDU suspiciens ·of rigged elections and intimidatiort. The 
CDU has stressed the necessity.for ·a period ef East German adjustment be-
fore conducting free elections. . The ·party has been vague on the means .of 
carrying this out. Chancellor Adenauer's own description af this re-
quirement is highly naive and unr·ealistic~ !!Several months would have 
to elapse to .give those poor people in the _S0viet zone a -chance· of. feeling 
.·fre.e again so that they c~uld vote as free people. 038 The Seviet UniQn 
would obviously reject the .implications ef this qualification. 
On repeated occa:sionsj the .Adenauer ~vernment has linked German 
·reunification·with the prerequisite or ·accompaniment of European unity. 
This has been, as indicated~ a concept which formed the basis oft~~ 
original CDU policy approach in 1946-. The entire ceurse !;If West Gennan 
foreign pG1icy since 1949 has -adhered,., te this eriginal emphasis, espec-
. ially with reispect to the Franc0-German -accord. 39 Federal Republic 
37see, for ·example, Bu.ndesministerium .·.fuer Gesamtdeutsche Fragen., 
pp. 17...;18z Note des .fu:!Q;deskan:z.lers !!! !~ Alliierte I-Johe Kannnission'IW 
1· Oktober 195©. 
38cf. Press -Office Diplamatic Mission, Washington, D. C. C0llected 
· Speeches, Statements 9 Presa,. Radie ,and TV Interviews .QY .pr. Konrad 
Adenauer,. pp. · 166..;7" · 
39Adenauer's emphasis on-friendly relations with France has been 
quite pron€lunced. The Chancellor has stated that, ''Withm.tt a France ... 
German understanding, we shall n0t attain the unification ·ef Europe; and 
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participation in the Western European Union" NATO, the Eurepean .inter-
national agencies and the .European Common Market, to name.but a few, 
illustrate the .con:tine:ntalism of CDU p0licy. 
Although created by the Western p0wers, the Federal Republic -could 
have been content with a highly -supervised version -0.f ''splendid isola-
tiGn.n That is) German:p0litical leaders could easily have directed the 
·course .of West Germany -away from ,further European entanglements, in re-
action to the havoc wrought 'by the Third Reich's aggressive policy of 
EurlQlpean censolidation. The fact that the Adenauer Government. has chosen 
tG) -foster a new brand of Eur@pean solidarity, based on peace and economic-
political-military interrelationships; illustrates the p0sitive approach 
of the CDU. Any reunified German state could never engage .in a syste-
matic power buildup unless its immediate neighbors gave their approval 
and assistance. With this in mind, the present :Government of the .Federal 
Republic has striven te create a favorable environment for the wider 
exercise of political prerogatives in the .future. This did net neces-
sarily·require an attachment of the Federal Republic to the Western 
. powers. The same effect Clf.)Uld pessibly have resulted from a rapproche~ 
between Germany-and the East~ ,Factars peculiar to the origin of the West 
German G~vernment, h0wever; determined the f~rmer. Despite the present 
· emphasis on the ,compatibility ~f German and western European -inte-rests) 
there yet remains-the.possibility of a reversal. If the Federal Re~ 
public, or a -future reunified Germany, felt that a Western orientation 
would n0 longer further its p0wer aspirations .and national security, it 
is quite p0s-sible that an eastern European orientation·would result. 
withaut the unification -0fEurope there .will be no unification ·0f 
Germany. n See Adenauer:, :N9rlJ! Indivisibl~.9 p. 51. 
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As noted 3 a neutralized Germany is unacceptable to the CDU. Such a 
situation would sterilize the power ambitions of the political leaders. 
This opposition to neutralization has been justified quite easily by the 
partyJ usually with reference to the "dangerous" implications involved. 
The party leaders have seldem indicated epenly their total rej.ection of 
neutra1izatiQin be.c,ause it would imply a loss of power. The reunification 
plans ,<;)f thie, SPD J which have frequently envisaged some sort of general 
nsupervised neutrality" for a reunified Germany,, have been ridiculed by 
the CDU as ut@pian.nl\:ilnsense and detrimental to national security. The 
CDU has been hesitant to reject categorically the possibility of a neutral 
Germany under nother prevailing condition:s~n but has made it quite clear 
that the present situation and that of the ,foreseeable future are not 
conducive to a change in Western policy. 40 
Appraisal 
The course .of CDU reunification p0licy has been in conformity with 
the general p0sitfon taken by Konrad Adenauer at the time of the party1s 
formation in 1946. Despite its growing revisionist tendencies; the CDU 
p0sition has been steadily CQJnsistent between 1949 and 196L This rigidi-
ty has c~nstituted .a positive appea.l for the West German electorate and 
has enabled the party t~ maintain its p0sition of leadership in the 
Federal Republic. 
The CDU has been highly successful in amplifying the reunification 
issue to a place of primary imp(!lrtance and has identified itself to the 
40cf. Treue, pp. 250--L The party program of 195.3 clearly indicated 
the CDU rejection of neutralization~ "Der ~ube ·~ die Moeglichkeit 
einer nootraien Existenz Deutschlands· fyt irreal~ so1ange die :gMen'"' 
waerti~ 'll:l..t§.Pannun§t fortbe$teht~ n 
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· electorate -as the true .guardian -of unification .as.pirations. The· party 
has -established -itself as the "watchdog" of Western policy.regarding 
German -reunificatHm. Unable to .actually participa.t_~in the ·East--West 
ne.gotiations on ·the .German .problem:i the .CDU 'has .nevertheless be.gun to 
influence Western proposals and .. policies and has been -partially re~pon-
sible .f0r ·bringing the .issue of reunifica,tion ;to a point of intransigence. 
The leadership 0f the ,CDU is :adamantly 0pp0-sed to any. -plan of re-
unification -or change in-Western policy which.weuld restrict its exercise 
.of power and-make German-security dependent on continued-accord bet~een 
hostile blocs. The .well-:intrenched pos.i tion ef the .Federal Reptfblic unde·:r 
the ·status qua will not be ·readily exchang·ed. for. an :inn0cu0us .all-German 
.sta·te subject te the aegis of the .great powers .• 
.. 
CHAPTER·III 
THE ·SOCIAL DEM0CRATIC PARTY (SPD) 
AND THE REUNIFICATION 'ISSUE 
The Opposi tlon R0le 0.f the Party 
Parcy: Characteristics~ At the end ef Warld War II the .Social Deme-
cratic Party of Gerrn:ahy (SPD) was .in a m,re effective pesition than any 
other residual political organization. Severely persecuted by the Nazi 
regimeJ the .Social ·nemocrats envisaged a new and brighter future for 'the 
po-st-war era. Ironica·11y:, h0wever, the· party has been los.ing suppo·rt 
since the end ~f the war and has become the anachronism of West German 
political life. 
Kurt. Schumacherj the Leader of the party until his death· in 1952:; 
struggled strenuously, but vainly, to tiring about an SPD.government·for 
the West German state. Schumacher's inte.grity and supp~rt .of demo--
cra tic government were above reproa·ch-" but the means he ·utilized were 
th0se of the past. The .SPD had always based its party program 0n time-
henered tenets (')f. s®cialism which had their ante.c.edents 'in such· histori ... 
cal events as the G0tha and Erfurt Congresses 13f 1875 and 1891. Es= 
sentially a Marxist party, the SPD had, h0wever, ad0pted nru.ch .lilif the early 
revisionism of Bernstein and Biebel. Well before the triumph of the 
Bolsheviks-in Russia there was a definitive split between the German 
Social Democrats and the Communists. In view of Social Democratic 
.strength during the Weimar Republic, it is correct to assume that the 
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party's failures in the.period -after World War II have not been attri-
butable to its "leftist" :orientation. Indeed., considering the reaction 
which accurred with respect to the excesses of the Nazi regime, the SPD 
·had every reason to unpretentiously await its investiture as the Govern-
ment party of the Federal Republic. 
The .SJPD was .one of the .first parties to be ,licensed in the Western 
:z;ones of occupation after the ban ion poli t1ca·1 activity was lifted by 
the Potsdam agreementso Unlike the CDU, the Social Democrats were faced 
with severe c~mpetitil£ln fr0m their counterparts in the Soviet zone. The 
leader 0f the original SPD in East Germany, Otto Grotew10hl~ met with 
Schumacher and Erich Ollenhauer in ·October!i 19450 Clearly representing 
the interests of the Soviet autho'ri ties, Grotewool attempted to get the 
-support of-Schumacher for the- proposed merger of the Communists and the 
Social Democirats into \One pa-I'ty 9 the S(:)cialist Unity Party. Schumacher 
and Ollenhauer were totally opposed and, consequently3 the division of 
Germany claimed one of its first victimso Grotewohl returned to Berlin 
to consummate the merger of the Communist and Social Democratic parties 
and Schmrnacher remained in West Germany9 declaring for an independent SPD. 1 
One particular as]Pect of the policy approach taken by the SPD between 
1945 and 1949 severely damaged the partyVs efficacy;, The Social Democrats 
had. traditionally been ardent SUJi)porte,Jl's of international c~opera tion and 
mutual endeavoro Quite ih contrast to this heritage;) the party~ subsequent 
1cf. Alfred Grosser, The .Coloss~ !gain, (New York3 1955) ~ po 191~ 
n o cm 10 May the SPD congress at Hanover elected Schuni:ather president 
and {)llenhauer vice~.president ~f a party which now existed only in the 
West. 11 Also see Speier and Davim:m, PPo 13-14 ~ 11Thus the SPD acquired 
a special status among the .political parties!/ in that it had no East 
German brancho II 
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to 1945J proceeded on more of a nationalistic tangent, During the same 
period the CDU was formulating its policy within the "concept of Europe" 
approach championed by Adenauer, The reason for the sudden change in 
SPD philosophy with respect to llinternationalism".appears to have been 
the fear .of party leadersJ particularly SchumacherJ that a continuation 
of party opposi ticm toward nationalism would run counter to the post-war 
mentality of the German people, 2 Such .an assumption was fundamentally 
wrong, Quite apart from any desire to 11atone11 to the world for the Nazi 
crimes .9 the German pe0ple were only too ready to cooperate internationally 
and thus ease the painful ignominies of foreign occupation, The leaders 
of the CDU were well aware of this. By taking such an approach the SPD 
occasionally incurrecl the disapproval of the Western occupational auth0ri-
ties J Il!'ho were highly suspicious of any nationalistic pronouncements" hciw-
ever mild, 
Aside from this tendency toward nationalistic emphasis, the SJPD did 
not ,,penly court the favor of the Western authorities~ as did the CDU o 
Western 0ccupation policy was frequently dencmnced by the party and 
Schumacher specifically spoke out against the growing division of Germany, 
Such criticism was prompted in part by the fact that the SPD had itself 
suffered! from the 'East-West split)> but it W6Juld appear that the party hoped 
to curry favQlr with the electorate by taking a definite anti-occupation 
stand, The West German populace was, of Ci£ilurse;i not enjoying the pre-
vailing privations of occupationJ but it was fairly obvious that further 
2c:L HiscocksJ po 83~ 11He ffichumachey was also convinced that the 
parties of the Right should no longer have a m((i)nopoly of appealing to 
· national sentiment, as had been the case in the past, 11 Also see Franz 
NeumannJ "German Democracy, 1950J 11 Internatiom1l ponqiliationJ N0, 461 
(MayJ 1950)J p, 277, 
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antagc,nism would only beget more privationso Again.:, the GDU strived to 
appear c((;)operative and bided its time until the reconstitution of a 
central civil government. The subsequent successes of the CDU in ar-
ranging the cessation of punitive Allied measures attested to the wisdom 
of its original policy of cooperation. 
The SPD did well in varieus local elections conducted between 1946 
and 1948. The decis.fon of the Western powers to establish a separate 
West German state was received by the party with few misgivings as to 
SPD electoral pri:llspects. · Always program conscious, the Social Democrats 
endeavored to formulate precise policies applicable to the wider ·sphere 
of West Germany as a whole. The drafters of the party platform did their 
job welL All of West Germany knew the SPD position before the elections 
were held. Likewise aware of the Social Democratic program.i and basically 
opp(j)sed 9 were the Western oiccupatfon powers. In brief .i the SPD specifi-
cally-reje:cted the Marshall Plan and the Ruhr Statute, categorically re-
pudiated agy possible rearmament plans applicable ti() West Germany.i made 
a series of demands on the Western powers and called for the ncessation 
of Allied interference in German internal affairs. 113 In addition, 
Schumacher became quite h@stile ab~ut alleged Western interference with 
respect to the drafting of the Basic Law.:, specifically over certain amend-
ments requested by the Western authorities, The Social Democrats were 
generally critical of the Basic Law and this may have stemmed from their 
desire to keep the We~l't German constitution relatively sketchy and 
utilize simple legislation to fill in the gaps in a plurality-dominated 
4 Bundestago It is further possible that Schumacher desired to put 
3Hemry L. Bretton.i nrhe German Sl[)cial Democratic Party and the Inter~ 
national Situatfon,n American Political Science Review.i 47 (1953).;l p. 9830 
4Cfo Hans J. Morgenthau, edo 3 Germany and the Future o:f EuropeJ 
(Chicago,i 1951).;l p. 125, 
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· the .SPD on record as being ''skeptical". of the. West German ·constitution 
and thus avoid accusations of "collaboration" when the SPD became,.as 
he ·heped, the Government party. 5 Irre.spective of political aims at the 
time, the Social Democrats later .regarded Western influence en the form 
of the Basic Law -as an attempt to ·insure the inclusion of any future all-
German state in the NATO alliance.6 
.Decline and .§.:.tagg,atiom The elections of 1949 did not result in a 
Social Democratic Government. Furthermore, the elections of 1953 and 1957 
kept the party in a static :political position while its arch rival, the 
CDU, increased its strength to more than ·SO.percent in the 1957 Bundestag. 
'fhe precise niceties 0f the SPD party programs had obviously failed to 
rally the support of the Wes-t Germa!\ vc>'ters. Since the elections af 1957 
the .SPD has finally begun t-o dispense with such rigidly definitive·posi-
tions andll in fact, the change in the·pal'ty's approach has moved it ex-
tremely close to the foreign -policy and open objectives of the CDU. 
The opening session. i;;f the 1949 Bundestag well illustrated the SfDVs 
intention to truly carry out the role of the Opposition party by opposing 
the Government at every point,. Various ·facets of CDU policy were vehe-
mently castigated and disharm,my was rampant be.tween the two parties. 7 
The decision of Schumacher tGll 0ppG·se the Government on practically all 
aspects of its foreign ·p~licy was executed vigor~msly. The :rerliance of 
5Bretton, American JP:olitica1 Science Review, 47 (1953}, p. 983~ 
"It was feared that unqualified acceptance of the Basic Law would lead 
to the charge that the .pa·rty shared re.sponsibility £:or the East ... West 
·split of Germany." 
6cr. A. A., vtGermany and World Peace~ a German Social Democrat View," 
The World. TodaY, _9 (April, 1953), pp. 157-8. 
7For a description and account of the apening sessi,m of the 
.Bund€)stag, see U.S. High Comniissililne-r; Gerqiany~s Parliament in Action~ 
The ·September 1949 Debate ~ the· Government.fs Statement of Policy, · (1950). 
70 
the CDU on the Western powers came in for constant criticism, Schumacher 
himself once .described Adenauer as the 11Federal Chancellor of the Allies" 
and was consequently expelled.from the.Bundestag for twenty days. As 
the East-West deadlock persistedJ and the Western powers proposed West 
German ,rearmament~ the SPD became hysterically abusive of the Govern-
ment and widely proclaimed that continued c0mpliance with Western policies 
would make reunificatiQm impossible. The defense debates in the .Ep.@~stag 
became extremely explosive.8 But the passionate speeches of the Social 
Democrats were of no avail as electoral appeals. The ·1953 elections 
seemingly endorsed the CDU~s rearmament policy and the 'SPD grudgingly 
acquiesced in the face of such su])port. Although faced with a git 
!!ccompli regarding rearmament~ the SPD later made the issue of atomic 
weapons on German soil its particular obsessiono There was also -cen-
tinued oppositiElln toward the "concept of Europe" policy pursued by Adenauer. 
A 1953 campaign poster of the .SPD hopefully proclaimed that IISchuman~s 
goneJ De Gasperi~s gone""--Adenauer will .soon be gcme too~-and then the 
wh0le European bogey will be gone.9 
In generalJ the .opp0sition 0f the SPD to the policies of the Adenauer 
.GGvermnent netted the party nothing. The CDU·continued to enhance its 
.electQiral appeal by defiantly prosecuting the very policies that the SPD 
so vehemently denounced. As an Opposition~ the Social Demoicrats declined 
steadily from the stanc:l.point of effectiveness. The death of Schumacher 
in 1952 brought little change •. Erich Ollenhauer succeeded Schumacher as 
8For a ·-.description of Erich Ollenhauer~ s participation in one such 
debate concerning the proposed European Defense Community3 see Walther 
Oschile:wski.9 et.aL J :Jk.!£h OlLenhauerg der Fuehrer d~r .Qlm§llsition, (Berlin 3 
1953) 9 p. 54. 
9weymar9 p, 466. 
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the chairman of the SPD and continued to uphold the pasto Although 
perhaps somewhat less intransigentJ Ollenhauer did not seriously attempt 
to facilitate a common SPD-CDU foreign policyo The so-called Ollenhauer 
plans of reunification proceeded 0n the basis of a rather vague formula 
whereby the NATO and Warsaw alliances W(l)uld be dropped in favor of some 
I 
type of general security system which would then be applied by the Sovie"t' 
Union and the Western powers to a reunified Germany JO Although these 
plans were an earnest attempt on the part of the SPD to break the reu:nifi~· 
cation deadlock; they met with derision from the CDU and apparent re-
j ecticm by the electorate o 
The SPD frequently made allegations with respect to the ureal11 in-
tentfons of the Government's reunification efforts. Chancellor Adenauer 
usually received the brunt of such attacks and was accused of being 
apathetic toward reunificatiit))n. The fact that Adenauer was a Catholic 
and a Rhinelander was pointed out to illustrate the Socialist charges. 
East Germany wasJ of course 9 pred0minantely Protestant ani would pre-
sumably afford more votes for the SPD than the CDU in the event of re-
unificatfono In additiitm~ Adenauer's fond attachment to the Rhineland 
was held up as indicative of his acc(l)mpanying dislike of East Germanso 
Sh@rtly before the 1953 electi!:ln:8~ an official SPD election statement 
charged thatg 
lnit is the whole, nature and character of the Chancellor 
that he is rCJ,()Jted in the West and .has no understanding for 
the East,--the far side of the Elbe. To him Berlin is a 
. pagan city9 and K01emigsberg is more alien to his whole 
mental outlook than anything in the Westo It is a disaster 
for Germany that it shou.ld be governed by a Chancellor 
who regards everything lying beyond the Elbe as no more 
than celonial territory, 1111 
lOsee Siegler.9 D0kumentati(f)n .!!!!: Deutschlan9-fra~J ppo 650'"20 
-1 
1. Weymar, po 4690 
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Such statements or insinuations, however, merely served to perpetuate 
the negative image of the SPD" The CDU had identified itself with the 
reunification issue to an extent that the critical remonstrances of the 
SPD were of no avail. 
As the opposition effectiveness of the SPD declined, younger members 
of the party urged that the·entire policy approach be revised" The main 
concern of such reform rec~mnnendations was the need for a connnon foreign 
policy with the cnu.12 This wi1luld have 6'bviously reli!uired a complete 
departure from the past for the SPD since the Christian Democrats were 
clearly in a well-intrenched position from which they would not move to 
accommodate even the most sacred SPD viewpoint. Minor cencessions were 
later evidenced at the SPD party congress which met prior to the 1957 
elections but the attempts were too half-hearted to divert support .from the 
cnuJ3 The sweeping victory of the CDU in 1957 proved conclusively that 
the SPD would have ta change its .entire philosophical approach to foreign 
policy before the stagnation of the party brotight about its virtual demise 
as an .effective politica·1 organization. 
The Party Position on Reuriificati(c)n 
Inadequacies of!!_ Weltanschauung: The explicit opposition 0f the SPD 
proved to be worthless as a means ©f displacing the CDU as the Gavernment 
party. The carefully formula te.d. party programs did not generally appeal 
to the West German electorate. The CDU .quite early presented itself 
12Cfw Hiscocks~ p. 9&. 
l3eans Kohn, 111\vest Germany~ New Era for German People, 11 Foreig_n 
Policy Association Headline Serte-s, No. 131 (September-October, 1958), 
p. 37. Also see l'SPD Conference in Munich;" The World ]2day, 32 (August, 
1956), .pp. 308~10. 
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to the voters as more of an "all things to all men" party and c,onse-
quently gained the support of voters who appreciated and needed this 
-elasticity. The·CDU, of course, made its positio.n with ·respect to re-
unification quite clear. Its reunification policy, however, was geared 
to the larger arena of Western power and se.curity objectives. The pain-
ful efforts of the SPD to keep its foreign policy within the more re-
stricted sphere of an lilutmoded ideology invoked a negative reaction from 
the electorate. 
In March; 1959·, ·the SPD made onelast supreme effort to rally the 
support of the voters a.round its Deutschlandplan.14 Well publicized and 
.widely proclaimed as the solution to the-division of Germany, this plan 
of unity seemingly represented the ,foretgn policy ·program of the .SPD for 
the ·1961 elections. However, some eight months later the party com-
pletely changed its position, discarded ·the-Deutschlaridplan and moved alm 
most fully behind the policy of the CDU. Such an astounding metamorphosis 
was clearly indicative of the changing character of the .party, the .old 
guard had finally crumbled. An indication of the ,new SPD policy a:pproach 
. was the nomination af Willy Brandt, the .Governing .Mayor of Berlin, as 
the party! s candidate-·:fo:r Fedeva1 Chancellor. -Ostensibly remaining the 
chairrnan of the party, Erich :Ollenhauer s·tepped ,aside. · His connections 
:With the past we·re apparently considered · detrimental to the electoral 
prospects of the 1,1newVl,SPD. ·In 1957,0llenhauer had described his party's 
f'oreign ·policy as the '.'substitution -of a :policy of understanding ·for a 
po'licy of strength."15 H0wever, the ,German ·electorate had neither 
14see below, p .• 76. 
15H. G. L.:, "Elections ·-in the .German Federal Republic;" The World Today, 
13 (September,· 1957}, p. 371. 
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"understood" nor appreciated the SPD policy. 
The sweeping Bad .Godesberg Program of November; 1959,16 has. opened 
the way for a common CDU-SPD foreign ·policy. It is somewhat doubtful 
whether the CDU would desire to include the SPD as a coalition member of 
the Government, but the•Social Democrats will become much more of an 
electoral opponent than before" The 1.1opposition threat" technique used 
by the CDU will have no more validity when the SPD reunification policies 
parallel the main lines of the Christian ·Democratic position. The Social 
Democrats may have made a decisive change in the West German political 
-scene by rejecting their traditional Weltanschauung for a-policy approach 
based en Realitaet. 
Proposals-and Policies: The SPD :has been in essential agreement with 
the CDU regarding such policies as the repU:dia,tion of East German legiti-
macy, the need for insuring free elections in any reunification referendum 
and the threat presented by possible Communist -infiltration of any- all-
German g0vernment. There has never been any question of the loyalty of 
the SPD to democratic ·government and .free. political expression. The open 
h0stility between the Democratic Republic Socialist Unity ·Party and the 
West German Social Democrats has definitely precluded any rapprochement 
between the twoo · It can saf.e1y be -assumed that the SPD would never agre~--
to an ,amalgamation ·!a)f the two parties considering the present character 
. of the East German S0cialists.. S!:.'ion after the .esta:blishment. of the 
Federal Republic the _SPD declared "unconditional war" on the Socialist 
Unity Party and publicly warned the ·East German Socialists that terrorist 
measures would be reciprocated by the SPD on the basis of "an eye for an 
16see below, p. 78. 
75 
eye.? a tooth for a to@th.nl7 
The .primary e~phasis af SPD policy between1949 and 1959 has re---
volved a.round its very opposition to the CDU. The Christian Democrats 
pursued a ,policy of full ceo.perati<.m with the Western powers; the SPD 
viewed this as perpetuating the division 0f Germany and advocated more 
of a ttfree agentu type of.policy. The CDU supported the rearmament of 
·the Federal Republic and'its inclusion in various .regional security pacts; 
the SPD totally rejected such measures, again because of the effect on re-
unification. ·The .party, ·in sh0rt, was highly negative in its policy ap-
proach and consequently offered little -in the :way of pragmatic alterna-
tives. 
The rtl4u!st comprehensive set of preiposals enunciated by the .SPD grew 
out of its rejection of the NATO alliance. While adamantly epposing the 
participation ·Of the Federal Republic in NATO, the SPD had to offer a 
substitute. Foir some time this was satisfied by merely advocating the 
withdrawal of West Germany from the Western alliance on the basis ef a 
quid J!rO :9w1> by the .Soviet Union1 viz. reunification. Such· J))roposals 
wer.~ ridiculed as "utopianism" by the ,CDU --and..? in fact, wer,e highly im-
. probable. The Soviet Union was nl!.llt interested in allowing the reunifi-
cation af Germany simply on the guarantee that an all-German sta·te W(:)uld 
then m11t reenter the Western Blee. Later ·reunification proposals of the 
SPD suggested the substitution 0f a general "security system" which would 
replace both the NATO and Warsaw alliances, 
.Prior to the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference in 1955J the SPD 
drafted a set of propes·als which indicated its :cGinception of this s.ome-
what vague.9 encll'.)mpassing security system~ 
17Foreigg ~adio Broadca~-ts; No. 25 (Febru~-<1950); Sec. QQ. 
- ) 
The Federal Government nru:st d0 its utmost to see that 
the, provisions in the Paris Agreements affecting. Germany 
on the Qne hand, and the Warsaw Treaty; on the.ether:, are 
-replaced, step by step, by agreements on military. posit:i,ons 
and rights, which .form the ,basis ef -a security ·syS'tem em-
bracing the whole of Europe, within which a uliifie"d Germany 
W(imld have rights· and obligations-. "This as.sumes agreement 
on the military status Gf a unified Germany acceptable t0 
all F0ur PQwers.9 :which _guarantees se.cut>ity .for the German 
;pe~ple at the same time.18 
In 1956 .9 this c~ncept o.f a general security system was ,connected with 
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world disarmament. SPD member F:ritz Erler pointed .eut the necessity 0f 
reunifying Germany prior to any agreement on disarmament at large.19 
This was in. contras·t to the ,efforts of Adenauer t_o. make general disarma-
ment a prerequisite 0r accampaniment-of Ge:tma:n reunification. 
There were numerous proposals and ,declarations with respect te ,the 
SPD.policy of achieving German reunification on the basis of mutual 
guarantees by the ,Soviet Union and ·the Western.powers •. These cannot be 
. enumerated ,fully and it suffices to say that the total efforts of the SPD 
toward this goal ·culminated in the 1959 "Plan for Germany,3 " or Deut;schland-
]!_an. The plan was presented by 'the party and hailed as the only feasible 
su:bstitu:te .for the Government's ttpolicy of strength." EssentiallyJ it 
contained four stages in the ,reuni;fication of· Ge,rmany~ (1) The :formation 
· of an all-German Conference with e,qua.1 representation from the Federal 
Republic and the Demc»cratic Republic.. · Ce,rtain economic consolidations: 
were 'to be effected within the scQpe .ef this stageo (2) The electi!i>n 
of an all-German :Parliamentary -Council. This would again be Ql.ll the basis 
of equal re.presen.tation. Decisions of the Council with r·espect to such 
18 Sie.gle'.t'j The Reunification ~1,ld Securitt. of ~rma!ll:, ·pp. :107-8. 
19 
·Cf. Siecg1er, Wiederve:reinigung un:d Skh~rheit Deut;schla~:., pp~ 
158-9·. 
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considerations as commcm economic policy.:> transportation and mail service 
could be vetQled by either Government's parliament.:, but could be repassed 
by the Council with a two..;thirds Ir1ajority vote. (3) The Council was to 
draft and have the authority to·pass all-German laws. Provision was 
made for all-German.refer-enda en certain matters. (4) Either on the initi-
ative of the Council or a referendum of the people 3 a National Constituent 
Assembly was to be called f.or the purpruise of drafting an all-German Consti-
00 tution."" 
The Deutschlandplan envisaged the withdrawal of the two German states 
from the NATO and Warsaw,alliances and the implementation of a mutual se~ 
curity pact to be guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United Statesa 
In addition to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany, Poland 3 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary3 the remaining national forces were to be .pro-
hibited from possessing atomic weaponso21 Essentially3 then9 the SPD 
plan resurrected the Rapacki Plan of·l958 with respect to a European 
nuclear-free zeneo 
Whatever its.sho:rtcomings 3 the plan was comprehensiveo It was sup-
posedly -formulated to constitute the backbone of. the party.' s program for 
the 1961 Bundestag elections. The fact that the plan was discarded in 
N!,llVember j 1959 ;1 at an extragrdinary session of the SPD held in Bad 
Godesberg 9 indicated the dissatisfaction that it aroused among certain 
20For a complete presentation of the 1959 !!Plan f,;JJJt' Germany/' see 
Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen PartEli Deutschland.s :1 ~~~~ 
der §PJ,2 3 (BimnJ 1959}0 Ppo 4-11 describe the steps and aims of the plan 
and the remainder of·this party publication is a question and answer 
nanalysisn of the proposalso 
2luwe Kitzinger 9 iwwest Germany~ A Pre-Electi"n Survey:i 11 The 1[orld !2.s!~L 
17 (Ma:rchj 1961), pp" 110-22, Kitzinger offers a concise summary of the 
Deutschlandplan and relates it to the current party positiono 
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party leade·rs. It was; in the ,:final analysis, merely a continuation ·of 
the past approach. ·rt is highly unlikely that the plan would have 
.furthered an SPD electoral victory, ·yet the abrupt turn-.about of the 
party was an unexpected development. The Bad Godesberg program did not 
-present an item by item cancellation -ef the .previous party position 'but 
:it did leave the :way open for ;pronounc·ed changes· which, ,for all practical 
purposes, swung the-party ·int~ line with CDU foreign policy. 22 In sharp 
contrast to earlier views 'held by Schumacher and.Clllenhaue:rii Willy Brandt 
· stated shortly after the Bad .Godesber.g Conference that~ 
_ n0u:r Manifesto un:de:rlines the fact that we stand 
firmly in the Western Community.:i and work for the Europe 
that is coming into being" German policy today, ·and in 
the years that·lie ahead, can be shaped 0nly on this 
basis. We are no wanderers between the fronts. We knew 
.-where we belongo !!23 . . 
Such remarks :as these definitely implied a latent .acceptance of the Govern-
ment's pro-Western positi~n and3 in fact, a continuance of Federal Republic 
participation in· the Western .alliance. 
The party declined to·insert·a provision in the Godesberg Program 
calling for "struggle against military conscription./' but did provide a 
sop for flpponents of conscription ·by indicating a disapproval. of con-
scription while Germ.any remains divided.24 This one item alone repre-
sented a drastic change in the party's policy. Following this up, 
22For the .complete program, see Social Democratic Party 0:f Germany] 
Basic Programme .!£ the S0ci;e_l Democratic ·Party sg_ GElrm.anL (Bonnj n.d. ). 
A good analysis of the Godesberg Conference is presented in The~! 
(Londe:in), N0vember 2li 1959, ·p. 737; 
23see Social Democratic Party of Germany,! Po~icy for Germany, 
(Bonn, n.d.), p,, 6. From ,an address by Willy Brandt before ·the SPD party 
congress in November, · 1960,. 
24cf. qna1ysis of Godesberg .Program by J. E. Williams, '.'Western 
Germ.any before the Sumnd t, 11 J'he War ld. 'l'oday, .16 (February, 1960)_, pp·. 
63-70. 
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the Godesberg Program explicitly stated that "the SPD affirms the need 
to defend the free dem0cratic society and it is in favor of national 
defenseo 1125 
The actions of the s~cial Dem0crats themselves have borne out the 
changed position of the pal'ty. The recent foreign policy debates in the 
Bundest~ have been characterized by a degree of orderliness and mildness 
previously unkn@wno Prior to adj((l)urning for the summer recess in 1960; 
· ex-Communist Herbert Wehner, a respected leader of the SPD::, set. forth six 
principle·s of f@reign policy which he claimed were now shared by both the 
SPD and the CDU~ 
L The present status 0f Berlin, virtually a part of 
the .Federal Republic, must be ·preservedo 
2o Opposed to any kind oif.dictatorship, the German 
pe\Glple had decided they belonged to the Western community 
of natioms, 
.3o All responsible .forces in West Germany rejected 
communismo 
4o All agreed that the living conditions of the East 
Germans must be alle:viatedo 
. So Already divided by connnunism3 Europe must not allow 
itself to be divided any further and must collaborate as 
extensively as possibleo 
60 All agreed that the demands 0f military security 
must be satisfiedJ and that the necessary measures should 
be concerted in such a way as to preserve peace.26 
Some of these principles wereJ of course 1 agreements of long standing; 
but WehnerWs entire presentation seemed calculated to probe the·recep-
tivity of the CDUo Wehner also stated that the SPD ~Rno longer questioned 
the necessity for Federal Germany to be committed unequivocally to NATO 
and rearmament and that ideas such as military disengagement and thinned-
out zones must be buried with the past"n27 The most recent SPD congress 
25social Democratic Party, Basic Programme , o o 3 .po 8,, 
26The Ecom:imist, July 9p 1960,j Po 1790 
27Tbido 
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(April, 1961)-fully 'reaffirmed the Gedesberg·approach. Willy Brandt, 
outlining the Government program ~f the SP.D, Cl:lmpletely endorsed Western 
·alliance ties -and, emphasized the role of the German Burideswehr in Euro= 
·. pean -defense. · He supported .European unification and, specifically, an-
nounced h'is intention to ·a)nplify existing relations with the Western 
powers.28 In sh('}rt, the SPD is net trying ·to oppose the ,CDU policy approach 
but has, finally.9 started to exceed ·that approach by using the same bases. 
Appraisal 
It remains to be _seen whether this fundamental· change in the party11s 
foreign policy approach will enhance its electoral appeal. The CDU, as 
the original auther of. such a ·pos.ition, ·has the advantage of twelve years 
of delivering it to the Germa:n electorate, .If the SPD continues to align 
·itself with all that the CDU has stood for regarding foreign policy, it 
could very well be that the .CDU will firid itself more and mere concerned 
with its domestic .program._ And, on this subject, it cannot be .denied 
that the Social Democrats.present a formidable challenge. Closely re--
lated to the British Labor Party in .its ecommtlc program3 the SPD may 
drain off support which was .previously given to the CDU by virtue Jlf its 
more realistic foreign policy. It must be assumed that the leadership of 
the party had exactly this in mind .when the drastic change was made at 
Bad Gadesberg-. This would seem especially valid in view of the fact that 
a great deal -af excess Marxian ·nbaggage" was similarly discarded by the 
party in Navember; 195~lo · The SPD is nraking every effort to become a mas-s 
· appeal party and ,the traditional ties of idealogy have been sacrifice,d to 
28see Brandt's presentati-on of the Gevernment program,in Vorstand der 
SPD'9 Das Regi~rungsprogramm der SP:O_, (Bonn, 1961), · especially pp. · 34=41. 
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this e.ffecto 
The Godesberg Program may represent a tacit recognition by the 
Sgcial Democrats of the final division of Germany"29 The Soviet Union 
is obviously not interested in granting reunification at present, ex-
cept on terms which would amount t\QI the virtual communization of an all-
German stateo Until 1955 the SPD foreign policy approach might have 
succeededo Subsequently, however::, the Soviet UnionJ like the Western 
powers::, has been completely intransigent and the Social Democrats have 
appararrtly realized this fact at lasto The position of the SPD between 
1945 and 1959 was essentially based .@n hazy ideals which would not accom·· 
modate to the possibility of an indefinitely disunited Germany, The pro~ 
posals {'J)f the party seemed almost desperate in their fervid content. 
The CDU recognized the status qu0 and was able to proceed rationally, if 
stubb@rnly3 with its reunification policy, It was, after all 9 the Govern·-
ment party and if reunification did n0t come about immediately the party 
was 9 in the meantinu~, enjoying a comfortable positfon of powero The Social 
Democrats 3 on the other hand 9 were quite naturally willing to endorse re-
unification -prl('J)posals with less restrictic:m9 if this wcmld someway bring 
in the millions of East German votes so badly needed by the party, In 
short 9 the ((Jlbjectives of the SPD were primarily focused on a ~ified 
29F'or an excellent presentation i:lf this viewpoint 9 see Lewis J, 
Edinger and Douglas Chalmers.i noverture 01r Swan Song: German Social 
Democracy9 1r Antioch Review9 20 (Summer" 1960L·pp, 163-75: nThe mare 
its _lG0desberg Progra:iiiJ prop,:ments stressed its design for the present 
situation in the Federal Republic, the less convincing seemed their 
professions to the cause of German reunification, If the program is 
indeed to be considered ~fundamental,~ designed to last for decades 
l:1ke former such programsJ one must either assume that it w0uld survive 
a review by delegates from Eastern Germany after reunificaticm=«Snot a 
very C((i)nvincing prospect in view of their totally different experiences-~ 
or that such a review is n0it likely to take place because reunification 
is n0to 11 
82 
Germany, rather than a West Germany. Therefore, the most strenuous ef-
forts of the party were for naught. By attempting to accomplish a most 
improbable task, the party's efficacy in the Federal Republic itself was 
severely undermined • 
. If the Godesberg Program represents a· permanent change in the SPD' s 
policy orientation, it can be assumed that the CDU will find its majority 
control of the G@vernment threatened~ but not necessarily destroyed. In 
the final analysisJ the CDU has suffered the .same fate as frequently be~ 
falls successful maj0rity ·partieS=·~the best p(ilrtions of its policy ap-
pr(ilach have been appropriated by the opposition party. Despite this 3 
h<§ilwever 3 the Christian Democrats are presented with an excellent opp(i)r= 
tunity to capitalize on the theft. The party may now claim to have been 
the nguiding 'light!! since the beginning. The opposition party will afford 
the CDU incontrovertible pro0f Qif its 11wisd©mon Consequently; in the face 
of any skepticism as to the permanence of the SPD Godesberg ProgramJ it 
could well be ,that the CDU will, !or a time, receive the overwhelming 
endorsement of the .West German electorates To counteract this reaction 
the SPD will have te focus every effort on presenting a continued unified 
fronto Any relaxation of or disenchantment with the new foreign policy 
approach will open the Social Democrats to fatal charges of political 
opportunism and create a persistent doubt as to just~ the SPD would 
de if it became the G@vermnent party, 
CHAPTER ·IV 
.SUMMARY AND OONC+USIONS 
The .present di vision of Germany irtto two Bepara te states is incii-
ca ti ve of the p@st-war dich0tomy-of power between the West and the East. 
Victorious allies in ·1945 3 the Westlirn powet·s arid the Soviet Union were 
.unable to act in accord ~n the reconstruction of an all-German state. 
The _p0wer vacuum.caused-by the fall of the.Third Reich created a situ-
ation -which was -fraught with dangerous implications for both blocs. 
-Neither could allow the .gther to achieve a preponderance .ef power over 
Germany and in Europe. Various agreements concluded during and after 
World War II established the legal bases of occupational auth0rity in 
-Germany3 but the conflicting po1itical objectives 0f the West and the 
East made a c0mmon -policy toward Germany impossible. Consequently, the 
efficacy -of the four-power condominium was totally undermined. 
Faced with the deterioration of the status qua, Western diplomacy 
sought to re-establish an independent G-erinftn ·state in the Western zones 
as an. integral component of the Weste.rn bloc. The de facto partition of 
Germany was the consequence 0f this aC'ti~no ·To abtain the necessary :sup-
port from the ~est Germans 1 the Wesiern bloc has had to assert certain 
·revisionist aims, viz" the ·restoration to West Germany of the boundaries 
existing pri0r to 1938-, The political leadership of the Federal Republic 
has thus been promised just campensation for its active role in support 
of the Western containment policy. At a time ·when the Soviet Union is 
steadily increasing its positien of power vis=a=vis the Western blec3 it 
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appears that the revisionistic aims of the Adenauer Gover:runent have con-
tributed .to the.present deadlacked situation -with re-Spect to the-German 
,problem. Alth0ugh a change in the pres,ent Western policy weuld likely 
produce severe :political repercussions in the Federal Republic, the 
Western bl~c sh,mld a_v(!!)id encumbering its prerogative of cempromise. 
The Soviet Unian has likewise tended to staticize its ·_position :with 
respect to the German.problemj but this is based en the status quo, i.e., 
the existence , of tw~ German .states. Soviet reunification .·prop0sals since 
1955 have invariably s@ught to _promote .direct negotiations between the two 
German states as a prerequisite or accompaniment of four~power consummation 
-of German .reunification" This qualification has been consistently rejected 
by the Wes-t j in view of its ·policy of nen-:recggnition of the German Demo-
cratic Republic.. The .fa·ct that the .Soviet Union, since 1955, has recog-
nized both German states, gives its proposals a practical leverage which 
-is not pl@ssessed by the West-. Soviet security ,aims -will never be sacri-
ficed willingly in order to reunify Germany. The Western proposals in-
variably seek to give an all-German state the preroga:ti ve of participating 
in military alliances.. .Equally consistent are the Soviet attempts to 
achieve the -neutralization -of a -reunified Germany, on the assumption that 
such a status would inevitably cause a neutral Germany to gravitate to-
ward the Eastern bloc~ either a:s a ''-friendlyn neighbor er actual partici-
pant,, 
Thie Christian Democrats have profited .from the .East-West split by 
closely identifying their ·;foreign policy with that of the Western bloc. 
By intensely prosecuting this policy 0f Western cooperation, -in line 
with the ~riginal ''concept of Eu:repen a,pproach favored by Konrad Adenauer, 
the CDU has emerged as the foremost spokesman of German reunification 
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aspirations. Th.e· 11nationalist" approachtaken by the SPDran completely 
·contrary to the.post-war :menta'lity of the German people. The fereign 
policy a:pproach·of the CDU constituted a ·positive appeal which has con.;.. 
sistently won the.support of the West German people. Despite the re-
cent conversion of the S~cial Demacrats ta a -policy similar to that of 
the CDU 9 it is :probable that the .Christian Democrats will continue to re-
ceive the overwhelming ·suppoTt of the German voters 3 due to their success-
ful accomplishments and leng-time idemtification .with Western policy and 
European revisionism. The .Gevernment ,party does not favor any.plan of 
· reunification which would result in the curtailment of German power3 such 
as the neutralization of a reunified Ger.many. The present Federal Govern-
ment enjoys a prestigious and powerful-position in the Western bloc and 
this status will rn:,t. readily be surrendered for a power-diluted all-German 
state. 
The Social Democrats have until recently pursued a rather negative 
foreign ;policy which has resu'.lted · in the party, s stagnation and• ineffec-
tiveness~ It has 'been as.sured .of a steady bloc of.votes from the working 
cla,ss which supports it 9 but the .CDU ·has consistently w©n the support of 
marginal grouJ>S which were attracted te its more realistic and successful 
foreign policy. Alth~mgh pursuit of the Godesberg Program may counteract 
this policy of ne.ga·tivism to some extent 3 the CDU is expected to retain 
its position of leadership un:til such time as its reunification policy 
becomes unrealizable 9 due to any ,future Western recognigition .of the 
status qu(:)-. If the ·Western powers should cease their support of the re= 
vision:istic objectives of the CDU 9 popular disenchantment would aversely 
affect the CDU positiim of leadership in the West German Republic. Such 
·acti~n ·by the Western pGwe:ts could b'e ,effectively countered by the West 
German ~ve-rmnent. There is always the possibility that the CDU leadership 
86 
might seek an accammodation with the Eastern bloc if the party's ob-
jectives :were repudiated by the Western bloc. A change :in 0rientation 
· could. pr·esuma bly be accomplished with,imt imperiling the political · leader-
ship of the CDU. A .preliminary step in this direction might be the formation 
of a German confede.ratitm:, ·such as .propesed by Grotewohl in -1952. Since 
a German withdrawal from the Western 'bloc would aestroy ·the -effectiveness 
of NAT0 and undermine American interests and 'the balance of power in 
Euro)l)e, there is not much likelihood of a Western !'!betrayal" of the .CDU 
and the German Federal Republic, 
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